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Introduction 
The Effects and Determinants of Coercive Economic 
Statecraft, Commodity Certification Programs, and Sanctions 
 
The practice of using coercive economic leverage to influence behavior and policies in 
foreign countries has a long history, but recent years have seen a burst of innovation in the 
area. Countries and multilateral organizations increasingly apply economic sanctions and 
similar constraints against business, people and even governments, for purposes as varied as 
supporting human rights and contesting trade practices. 
A popular subject of academic research in the wake of sanction programs against 
Rhodesia and Apartheid South Africa, the effectiveness of economic sanctions has been a 
central policy question for decades. In most cases, researchers have found that sanctions are 
not particularly effective in modifying the behavior of states, or even individuals. Despite a 
few notable exceptions, researchers as diverse as Knorr (1975), Hufbaur, Schott and Elliott 
(1990), Pape (1997), Kaempher (1987), Baldwin (1985) and many others, find that sanctions 
rarely have the impact that sending countries claim to be seeking, and at times such actions 
are even counterproductive. 
There is a great deal of diversity in the implementation of sanction programs however, 
and there can be little doubt that regulations do have the potential to influence behavior in 
some circumstances. Using an event study approach, DellaVigna and La Ferrara (2010) for 
instance show that arms trading companies in well-regulated markets do indeed react to 
news about trade embargoes put in place by the United Nations. Indeed, the authors show 
that reactions are sufficiently large, and their approach sufficiently sensitive, to permit the 
identification of individual organizations and companies that evade restrictions. Depending 
on the goals of the institution using economic leverage however, industry reactions to 
sanctions can work either for, or against, the intent of the restrictions in place. 
Other current research is less concerned with the effectiveness of sanctions, and focuses 
instead on the extent to which such economic controls cause collateral damage against 
people who are not targeted. The findings of these investigations have helped to limit the 
use of sanctions in some circumstances, as it has become increasingly apparent that 
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sanctions can be severely damaging. Petrescu (2007) for instance, shows that infants 
exposed to economic sanctions in utero weigh less than the ones that were not, and that 
children born in the first two years of sanctions episodes are more likely to die before their 
third birthdays (among other harmful effects). Barry (2000) shows that US sanctions against 
Cuba have also significantly impacted health outcomes, while other researchers have shown 
large declines in employment, consumption and other livelihood indicators in targeted 
countries due to sanction programs.  
In the first chapter of this dissertation, I consider one recent program crafted in the 
United States that attempted a balance between these two considerations  both the 
adverse impacts of using economic leverage, and the effectiveness of regulations against the 
interests of targets. The effort was designed to undermine violent groups operating in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) by requiring companies to account for the sources 
of minerals that could be linked to violent conflict. The US Congress’s stated ambition was to 
constrain commerce that supported violence in the DRC, while allowing legitimate 
production of the regulated minerals to continue.  
Many observers were skeptical that such a balance could be struck, and claimed that the 
rules were a de facto ban on mineral exports from the DRC. I show however that market 
responses to changes in legislation were not consistent with the view that the US banned 
the use of regulated minerals from the DRC completely. Because the returns for companies 
in the US remained responsive to rules issued by the DRC’s Minister of Mines, it is more 
likely the case that investors expected at least some trade in the regulated minerals to 
continue. 
In the second chapter of this dissertation, I consider a similar but distinct question. 
Focusing on the importance of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS)  which 
regulates diamond production and trade in many countries  I investigate regulations and 
important events relating to the global diamond industry. Like the minerals regulation in the 
United States, the KPCS was seen by many as a compromise, which avoided harsher export 
and import controls. The regime was also seen by many as a more appealing alternative to 
ad hoc systems created on a country-by-country basis. That industry actors participated in 
the development of the regulatory system caused considerable controversy however, and 
many critics of the KPCS claimed that it did not go far enough to undermine violence in 
diamond producing countries.  
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The results I present in the second chapter of this dissertation support the point of view 
that regulations and events relating to the KPCS had (and may continue to have) a significant 
impact on diamond markets, but also call into question common descriptions of the 
diamond industry, and the industry’s relationship to the KPCS. Although it is often argued in 
the literature that the creation of the KPCS benefited large diamond mining companies, I 
show that reactions in financial markets were inconsistent with this point of view. Diamond 
mining companies experienced abnormally low returns on their shares coinciding with the 
implementation of rules on the global diamond industry, and it is difficult to argue that the 
regime could have been construed as net “good news” for most diamond mining companies 
around the world. 
I also provide evidence of an important nuance in the relationship between regulations 
and the diamond industry. Retail companies, including large-scale jewelry firms, experienced 
abnormally high returns coinciding with events that supported the credibility of the KPCS, 
while they experienced abnormally low returns for events that called that credibility into 
question. There was not such relationship for diamond mining companies however. This 
suggests that the companies that benefit from the credibility brought by the KPCS are mostly 
in the retail side of the business, and that such companies have incentives for the Process to 
at least appear effective in its mission. 
These first two papers demonstrate that, although significant questions about the effects 
of using economic leverage against such targets remain, critiques of the two programs may 
have been at times overstated. The findings also suggest that the interests of industry actors 
may at times have been misrepresented, by both regulation supporters and detractors. The 
results show that both the KPCS and mineral regulations in the United States influenced the 
markets they proposed to regulate, which indicates that regulations were seen as credible, 
to at least some extent. Moreover, in many respects, responses in financial markets to 
regulatory events covered in the first two chapters of this dissertation are consistent with 
the stated goals of the regulators.  
While the first two chapters focus on specific programs, in the final chapter I turn to the 
broader question of what factors predict a country using sanctions against another country. I 
focus on the extent to which variation in the economic leverage one country has over 
another leaves a pair of countries more, or less likely to use sanctions. In that framework, I 
analyze several questions that have been posed in the recent literature, and identify a 
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number of characteristics of sending and receiving countries that are strongly predictive of 
sanction use. 
I show that large economies dominate among countries that use and threaten to use 
sanctions, and that smaller economies rarely initiate sanctions against others. The results 
also show that countries that are poorer are more often targeted with sanctions, and that an 
ongoing conflict in either the sending or the target country predicts sanction use. The last 
chapter also shows that many indicators of economic vulnerability, and particularly issues of 
trade concentration and diversity, play a crucial role in the decision to initiate or refrain from 
using sanctions. 
These three chapters taken together provide an empirical investigation into the effects 
and determinants of sanctions and other forms of coercive economic statecraft. The results 
contribute to the ongoing discussion over how best to understand economic sanctions and 
similar programs in the current policy environment. 
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Chapter I 
Trade Restrictions and Conflict Commodities: Market 
Reactions to Regulations on Conflict Minerals from the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo 
 
 
In this chapter, I use an event study approach to investigate the claim that 
conflict minerals legislation in the United States (US) led to a ban on some mining 
exports from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and that the passage 
of US regulation caused a ban on both production and trade by regulators in the 
DRC several months later. I also consider the assertion that conflict minerals 
legislation imposed severe costs for companies that report to the Securities and 
Exchange Commission in the US. 
 
I find that returns for some companies traded on US stock exchanges were 
sensitive to changes in production in the DRC after the proposed legislation 
became law in the US. This either suggests that some financial market 
participants did not expect an immediate full embargo on newly-regulated 
Congolese mining and trading activities, or that market participants did not 
expect trade to be halted indefinitely. Reactions to a DRC-imposed ban on 
production were statistically significant; indicating that additional reductions in 
trade were not fully anticipated by financial market participants after regulations 
became law in the US.  
 
I also find that among metal and gold mining companies traded on US exchanges, 
returns were abnormally high when conflict mineral legislation became more 
probable. Electronic communication manufacturing firms, which as a group were 
a target for many supporters of conflict mineral regulations, experienced no 
systematically abnormal returns corresponding to important dates in the US 
legislative process that I consider, but experienced abnormally positive returns 
coinciding with the ban on mining in the eastern DRC. 
 
JEL Classification: F51, Q34, Q37 
Keywords: Mining, Event Study, Conflict Minerals, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Trade Regulations, Natural Resources  
8 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Central Africa, and specifically the Democratic Republic of the Congo, is remarkably 
endowed with natural resources. Many groups, including colonial and post-colonial 
governments, armed rebels, foreign armies, and both local and international militias have 
sought to use this substantial natural resource wealth to their advantage. 
The aftereffects of conflicts in central Africa left several violent organizations established 
in the eastern part of the DRC in the 2000s. Some grew out of conflicts in neighboring 
countries such as the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, as well as insurgencies in Burundi, Uganda, 
and the Central African Republic, while others originated in the DRC.  
Alongside exploiting civilians, illicit taxation and looting, violent groups have often 
benefited from the region’s mining potential to finance their operations. In 2009 and 2010, 
the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR), the remainder of the Congrès 
national pour la défense du peuple (CNDP), and the Alliance des patriots pour un Congo libre 
et souverain (APCLS) were some of the largest groups operating in the DRC. Smaller groups 
included the Forces patriotiques pour la libération du Congo (FPLC) and the Forces 
républicaines federalists (FRF) (Debelle, Diallo, Hege, Robarts, & Tarnawski, 2010). Members 
of the national military, the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo 
(FARDC), were also documented committing human rights violations and profiting from 
mining ventures in the eastern provinces of the DRC.1  
In the spring of 2010, the US Congress passed legislation requiring that companies listed 
on US stock exchanges (or required to file with the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC)) publicly disclose purchases or use of several mineral types sourced from the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo. The bill was signed into law as Section 1502 of the Dodd–
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank). 
The Act directed several US government agencies to impose reporting requirements for 
tin,2 tungsten,3 tantalum4 and gold.5 In addition to affecting mining and smelting 
                                                          
1 The Bisie mine in North Kivu produced 70% of the cassiterite mined in North Kivu in 2010 while under the 
control of former CNDP members serving as FARDC troops (Global Witness Limited, 2011). 
2 The DRC represented about 4% of global output in tin in 2009 (Carlin, 2009). 
3 In 2006, the mining of wolframite (tungsten ore) was the strongest growth sector in the mineral industry of 
North Kivu Province; wolframite was also mined in South Kivu Province. From 2002 to 2006, reported 
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operations, the regulations were also expected to impact electronics companies, as many of 
the regulated mineral types are necessary in the production of computers, mobile phones 
and similar goods. The wording of the bill also allowed for narrowing or expanding the 
precise definition of “conflict minerals” in light of unfolding events in the DRC and 
surrounding countries. Minerals that did not originate in central Africa were not subject to 
additional restrictions. 
In September 2010, several months after the Act passed in the US, President Joseph 
Kabila of the DRC ordered a ban on mining or trading the same four minerals in three 
eastern provinces6 during a visit to North Kivu, saying that he hoped to contain “criminal 
gangs” or “mafias”. The DRC’s Minister of Mines followed a day later with a similarly worded 
order implementing the President’s declaration. Local markets reacted strongly to the 
announcement and prices for the targeted goods dropped steeply. 
Some mining continued, but the activities were a fraction of previous production. The UN 
Group of Experts for the DRC reported that illegal trading began soon after President 
Kabila’s announcement, but that the restrictions in place required smugglers to resort to 
extraordinary measures. The majority of mines closed legal production, and several large 
buying and smelting groups withdrew or significantly scaled back operations (Debelle, 
Diallo, Hege, Robarts, & Tarnawski, 2010). 
 
1.1.2 Controversy Surrounding the Conflict Minerals Law 
Even before the creation of the US conflict minerals law in 2010, a vocal group of regional 
experts, activists and commentators were skeptical of trade regulations on minerals from 
the DRC. Critics often argued that curtailing trade would at best do nothing to improve the 
situation in the region, and could easily harm thousands of artisanal miners and others 
linked to the mining industry. A general concern for both industry actors and other 
detractors of the law was that the legislation would close markets to companies operating in 
the United States but not in other countries.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
wolframite exports from South Kivu Province increased to 574 t from 159 t, and those from North Kivu 
Province, to 401 t from 26 t (Yager, 2009) (Shedd, 2011) 
4 The DRC represented about 8-14% of global tantalite production in 2010 
5 Gold mines in the Fizi, the Kalehe, and the Mwenga Territories in Sud-Kivu Province were reportedly under 
the control of the FDLR in 2008-09, when illegal taxation of artisanal gold mining accounted for an estimated 
75% of the FDLR’s revenues (Yager, 2009) 
6 North Kivu, South Kivu and Maniema 
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The most vocal critics of the conflict minerals regulations in the US feared that the policy 
would seriously harm people working in the mining industry regardless of their relationship 
to violence in the region. Seay (2012) argues that: “[the conflict mineral legislation] has 
created a de facto ban on Congolese mineral exports, put anywhere from tens of thousands 
up to 2 million Congolese miners out of work in the eastern Congo, and, despite ending 
most of the trade in Congolese conflict minerals, done little to improve the security situation 
or the daily lives of most Congolese”. In a presentation given to the House Subcommittee on 
International Monetary Policy and Trade on May 10, 2012, Seay added that Section 1502 
was the cause of the ban issued by the DRC’s Minister of Mines. (The United States House of 
Representatives Committee on Financial Services, 2012) 
In the following sections, I show that although there can be little doubt that Section 1502 
affected the target markets, the immediate reception of the legislation by market 
participants indicates that a full embargo was not anticipated in the near term, 
contradicting the point of view of some critics of the law. Furthermore, I show that the 
announcement by President Kabila coincided with abnormal returns for many companies 
traded on US exchanges, suggesting that the move came as a surprise to at least some 
market participants. 
I also show that many companies required to report to the SEC experienced abnormally 
high returns corresponding to dates when legislation in the US became more likely. This 
result offers a puzzle, as many industry groups lobbied to lighten the requirements, or to 
implement them more gradually, and the later announcement of proposed specific SEC 
regulations coincided with negative returns for many companies. The data analyzed here do 
not provide sufficient information to fully answer the question of why some regulated 
companies were expected to benefit from the regulations at certain times (or perhaps, were 
expected to be harmed less than was previously expected), but a discussion of some 
possibilities is included in Section 1.5. 
The next section briefly describes the event study methodology used in the empirical 
section of this paper. Section 1.3 describes the data used, and Section 1.4 describes the 
results, dividing the analysis by industry type and discussing each individually. Section 1.5 
discusses possible interpretations of the results, and Section 1.6 concludes. 
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1.2  Event Study Methodology  
Investigating regulated companies is one way to assess market expectations about the 
effects of regulations. In the following section, I report results using the event study 
approach to evaluate regulated companies.  This method adds insight into whether, and in 
what direction, specific interventions affected targeted markets by examining the returns on 
the securities of regulated companies. In some cases, unusually large departures from 
expected returns indicate that new information led to a re-evaluation of a security’s value.  
In the literature on the economics of conflict and development, DellaVigna and La Ferrara 
(2010) use the event study approach to investigate the effects of arms embargos. They 
show that analysts can identify firms that evade restrictions by looking at the changes in 
expected returns attributable to violent events in countries subject to UN restrictions. In 
another study, Guidolin and La Ferrara (2007) use a similar methodology to assess the 
effects of conflict on returns for diamond mining companies in Angola.  
In those papers, as in most event studies, the authors focus on the “event window” — 
the period of time during which investors learn about the event that is under study. In the 
following sections, I predict returns for securities during a given event window using 
estimates from an “estimation window”— an extended period prior to the event — using 
ordinary least squares regression. 
The event study approach is based on the assumptions of the constant expected return 
model (CER)7 that, as a regression model, is expressed: 
                                                                                     
        
          
                                                                       
   (       )  {
       
        
                                                                
The term     is the return on security   at time    and    is expected return. The error term 
    in the expression is a Gaussian white noise (GWN) process.  
As applied to event studies, a standard formulation of the regression model emphasizes 
the specific time period during which an event of interest took place, and that expected 
                                                          
7(a) Covariance stationary and ergodicity:                     
  is a covariance stationary and ergodic 
stochastic process with  [   ]    ,            
 ,                  , and                  
(b) Normality:            
   for all   and   
(c) No serial correlation:                              for     and             
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returns are related to market-wide returns. The regression model can therefore be adapted 
to read: 
             ∑     
  
   
                                               
Where     is again the return on security   at time   and       the systematic risk for 
security  . The term    refers to the market return for the security exchange on which   
trades,8 and     is again a stochastic error term with a mean equal to zero and variance   
 . 
The dummy variable      is equal to one during the event window and zero otherwise, and 
   is equal to the number of days of the event window. The term    accounts for the 
difference between the actual return and the predicted return, which is usually referred to 
as the “abnormal return” in event studies. 
In the following analysis, I look at an event window of several days because “news” or 
information about the value of a security does not circulate instantaneously for all market 
participants. The full effect of the event is a summation of the daily abnormal returns over 
the event window, which is referred to as the cumulative abnormal return or CAR:9 
      ∑  ̂  
  
   
                                                                                    
Under normal circumstances, the expected CAR should be equal to zero.10 A statistically 
significant shift away from expected returns however, signifies that new information has 
caused a re-evaluation: 
 
   ∑      
     
                                                                                 
   ∑      
     
                                                                                  
 
                                                          
8 Market returns can be considered in several forms; the standard reported in this paper is equally-weighted 
returns and the S&P 500 index. The reported results are robust to using value-weighted returns on specific 
exchanges unless otherwise noted. 
9This is often expressed in the event study literature as simply the error term ϵ summed over the event 
window, rather than the defining the abnormal portion alongside a separate error term 
10 Implied by (1)                 [   ], the term     is defined as the deviation of the random return 
from its expected value 
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Most trade restrictions do not affect all companies in the same way, as regulations could 
be beneficial for some firms (leading to a positive CAR) and harmful for others (leading to a 
negative CAR). The two types could be defined as those companies that would be expected 
to benefit from regulations (   ), and those that would be expected to be harmed (   ) 
by regulations. Rewriting the null and alternate hypotheses, the approach is expressed: 
 
   ∑      
     
                                                                                 
   ∑      
     
{
                           
                           
                            
And: 
   ∑      
     
                                                                                   
   ∑      
     
{
                           
                           
                             
 
As in     , both      and       state that the expected CAR=0. But in this more explicit 
statement of the null and alternate hypotheses, the same event could characterize opposite 
impacts depending on the company type. 
 
1.3 Data and Event Dates 
In the following section, I use the Center for Research in Security Prices’ (CRSP) database on 
daily returns for securities that trade on any major US exchange, and market indices for the 
exchange on which each security trades.11 In the following analysis, I calculate the abnormal 
returns over event windows of both three and five trading days for each event.12 For both 
window lengths, I use an estimation window of 120 trading days. 
 To identify significant changes due to the legislation in the US is difficult, as there were 
public discussions of possible action over a long period. However, a strong candidate date is 
April 28, 2010, when the Conflict Minerals Trade Act passed unanimously out of a hearing of 
the House Foreign Affairs Committee.13 The prospects of the bill becoming law were much 
                                                          
11 Source: ©2011 CRSP®, Center for Research in Security Prices. Booth School of Business, the University of 
Chicago. Used with permission. All rights reserved. www.crsp.chicagobooth.edu 
12 As a robustness check, both are reported below 
13 The Conflict Minerals Trade Act: H.R. 4128 
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greater after such a show of support, and the Senate version gained four additional co-
sponsors nearly simultaneously.14 The language of the final bill came from a version 
proposed by Senator Sam Brownback, who added the measure to the Dodd-Frank financial 
reform effort on June 24, 2010. At that time, the negotiations over Dodd-Frank were nearly 
completed and the Act had broad bi-partisan support. Because the Act was widely expected 
to pass, the addition of Section 1502 to Dodd-Frank substantially increased the likelihood 
that conflict minerals legislation would become law.  
The date of interest for the DRC is more straightforward, as the mining ban discussed 
previously was announced by President Kabila suddenly over the 9th- 10th of September, 
2010. 
On December 15, 2010, the SEC unanimously voted to propose rules for disclosure of the 
use of conflict minerals, and included all companies that file with the Commission under the 
Exchange Act. The Commission proposed requiring that all companies for which regulated 
minerals were “necessary to the functionality or production” of the company’s products 
report to the SEC on the issue, using a broader definition than many observers had 
expected. This date is also included in the analysis below. 
The results in the following sections focus on several activity types that were directly 
targeted by the legislation, including the operations of mining, smelting, and electronics 
manufacturing companies.15 After dropping companies with insufficient observations, the 
data include 91 metal mining companies,16 40 smelting/casting companies, and 475 
electronics manufacturing companies. The most interesting subset of electronic 
manufacturing companies is communication equipment manufacturers, which includes 
many companies that produce mobile phones. That category contains between 93 and 98 
companies.  
I use several market indices as robustness checks and report results using the S&P 500 
index as well as an equally weighted index. Finding only one index for which results are non-
significant is usually sufficient to assume that returns were not abnormal. 
 
                                                          
14The Senate Version: S. 891 
15 Electronic manufacturing firms were the largest buyers of several of the raw materials which were 
regulated, and electronic manufacturing trade groups lobbied extensively concerning the implementation of 
the legislation. 
16 Although I also provide results for “all mining companies” below, using a much broader definition 
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Table 1.1 
 
 
1.4 Results 
The primary finding of this study is that many regulated US-listed companies experienced 
abnormal returns on the 9th of September, 2010 when President Joseph Kabila ordered the 
ban on conflict minerals and when planned US regulations became more explicit on 
December 15th, 2010. Because at this time the US legislation on conflict minerals had 
already passed, I interpret markets being sensitive to events in the region as evidence that 
some companies were still exposed to changes in regulated Congolese mineral production. 
This suggests that some market participants expected trade and/or production of the 
regulated minerals in the region to continue, or start again at some point in the future.17 It 
also indicates that the ban instituted by President Kabila in the DRC was sufficiently 
unanticipated by market participants to lead to abnormal returns for companies traded on 
US markets. 
I also find that shares of US-listed mining companies experienced abnormally high 
returns when the probability of trade restrictions in the US increased. Some companies 
were also valued at an abnormally high level when the DRC experienced a large decrease in 
mineral production due to the government-imposed ban.  
                                                          
17 One interpretation of this result is that some firms (including many that remained un-regulated by the SEC) 
were intending to continue legally sourcing minerals from the region. One way to do so could have been 
through an OECD-spearheaded certification scheme, and if this were true, it would have been a victory for 
advocates of the legislation. Alternatively, the results could indicate that investors expected unregulated trade 
to continue. 
Name Date Description
Pass Committee April 28, 2010
The measure passes unanimously out of a 
hearing of the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee
Added to Dodd-Frank June 24, 2010 The measure is added to the Dodd-Frank 
financial reform effort
Kabila Announce  September 9-10, 2010 President Joseph Kabila outlaws all artisanal 
mining activities in three eastern provinces
SEC Reg Announce December 15, 2010 The SEC unanimously votes to propose rules 
for disclosure
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Returns for US-listed electronics manufacturers displayed the most interesting response 
to the legislation and the ban in the DRC. There appears to have been no abnormal returns 
around the dates for the US legislation becoming more likely.  For the dates of Kabila’s 
announcement of the mining ban however, there were positive abnormal returns 
specifically for US-listed communications equipment manufacturing firms, which were a 
main target of advocacy groups leading up to the US legislation, and large consumers of the 
regulated mineral types. 
1.4.1  Mining Companies 
Figure 1.1  
 
Table 1.2 
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Cumulative Abnormal Returns for 
Metal Mining Compaines on All 
Event Dates  
Committee
Dodd/Frank
Kabila
Announcement
SEC Announcement
All Mining
Equal-Weight  S&P 500 Equal-Weight S&P 500
Pass Committee 0.0089 * 0.0034 0.0036 0.0007
N=331 (.0038) (.0038) (.0031) (.0031)
Added to Dodd-Frank 0.0024 0.0057 0.0057 0.0197 ***
N=330 (.0042) (.0042) (.0034) (.0034)
Kabila Announce -0.0044 -0.0062 -0.0085 * -0.0064
N=330 (.0046) (.0046) (.0037) (.0037)
SEC Reg Announce -0.0149 *** -0.0145 *** -0.0225 *** -0.0228 ***
N=337 (.0034) (.0034) (.0025) (.0025)
* p<0.05;  ** p<0.01;  *** p<0.001 (Robust Standard Errors)
Avg. Cum. Abnormal (5 day %) Avg. Cum. Abnormal (3 day %)
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Table 1.3 
 
Table 1.4 
 
 
Metal and gold mining companies traded on US exchanges had positive abnormal returns 
during the event windows for both the date coinciding with approval of the bill in 
committee proceedings, and the legislation’s addition to Dodd-Frank. This is in contrast to 
mining companies taken as a group, which, over both dates, did not experience 
systematically abnormal returns. For the date coinciding with the addition of Section 1502 
to Dodd-Frank there was greater sensitivity to the timing of the event window for mining 
companies in general, but not for metal mining companies specifically — thus metal mining 
companies likely experienced a stronger reaction to the legislation than was the case for 
their industry defined more broadly. 
The effect of President Kabila’s announcement was ambiguous on metal and gold mining 
companies. Over the three-day window, both company types experienced lower than 
expected returns, but over the longer event window the returns change direction. The 
positive returns over the five-day window approach significance for metal mining firms. 
Metal Mining
Equal-Weight  S&P 500 Equal-Weight S&P 500
Pass Committee 0.0245 ** 0.0184 * 0.0280 *** 0.0248 ***
N=91 (0.0081) (.0081) (.0055) (.0055)
Added to Dodd-Frank 0.0242 *** 0.0277 *** 0.0301 *** 0.0433 ***
N=91 (.0071) (.0071) (.0059) (.0057)
Kabila Announce 0.0127 0.0120 -0.0159 *** -0.0135 ***
N=90 (.0074) (.0074) (.0041) (.0041)
SEC Reg Announce -0.0183 * -0.0179 * -0.0280 *** -0.0284 ***
N=93 (0.0078) (.0078) (.0057) (.0057)
* p<0.05;  ** p<0.01;  *** p<0.001 (Robust Standard Errors)
Avg. Cum. Abnormal (5 day %) Avg. Cum. Abnormal (3 day %)
Gold Mining
Equal-Weight  S&P 500 Equal-Weight S&P 500
Pass Committee 0.0357 *** 0.0298 ** 0.0369 *** 0.0338 ***
N=61 (.0092) (.0092) (.0065) (.0065)
Added to Dodd-Frank 0.0272 *** 0.0299 *** 0.0335 *** 0.0450 ***
N=61 (.006) (.0061) (.0045) (.0045)
Kabila Announce 0.0144 0.0143 -0.0159 ** -0.0134 *
N=59 (.01) (.01) (.0054) (.0054)
SEC Reg Announce 0.0144 -0.0081 -0.0264 *** -0.0267 ***
N=60 (.01) (.011) (.0078) (.0078)
* p<0.05;  ** p<0.01;  *** p<0.001 (Robust Standard Errors)
Avg. Cum. Abnormal (5 day %) Avg. Cum. Abnormal (3 day %)
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Taken as a group, all mining companies experienced abnormally lower returns when the 
SEC announced its rule implementation intentions on December 15th, 2011. For metal and 
gold mining companies however, negative returns were significant only over the shorter 
event window. 
Metal mining companies also experienced abnormally low returns during and after the 
SEC announcement, but in contrast to other event dates, returns for gold mining companies 
did not follow those of metal mining companies. Over the shorter event window, gold 
mining companies had lower than expected returns, but by the fifth day abnormal returns 
were positive and not significantly different from expectations. 
Table 1.5 
 
 
Among mining companies with rights to mine in the DRC, both Anglogold Ashanti and 
Rubicon Metals Corp. had high returns over the five-day period coinciding with US 
legislation becoming more likely on April 28th, 2010, although US-regulated mining 
companies operating in the DRC as a whole did not have statistically significant abnormal 
returns over that event date. The Securities and Exchange Commission’s announcement of 
proposed regulations coincided with statistically significant negative returns for mining 
companies with operations in the DRC. 
 
 
 
 
 
Production in DRC
Equal-Weight  S&P 500 Equal-Weight S&P 500
Pass Committee 0.0060 0.0010 0.0130 0.0103
N=5 (.0316) (.0314) (.0192) (.0191)
Added to Dodd-Frank 0.0494 0.0549 0.0405 * 0.0550 **
N=5 (.0246) (.0226) (.0118) (.0119)
Kabila Announce 0.0029 0.0008 -0.0073 -0.0059
N=5 (.0187) (.0195) (.0121) (.0124)
SEC Reg Announce -0.0483 * -0.0478 * -0.0322 ** -0.0325 **
N=5 (.0156) (.0155) (.0048) (.0048)
* p<0.05;  ** p<0.01;  *** p<0.001 (Robust Standard Errors)
Avg. Cum. Abnormal (5 day %) Avg. Cum. Abnormal (3 day %)
19 
 
1.4.2 Smelting and Casting 
Table 1.6 
 
During the “pass committee” event window around April 28, 2010, smelting companies 
experienced abnormally negative returns at a statistically significant level. Returns were also 
lower than expected for the window corresponding to President Kabila’s announcement, 
although the abnormal returns were only significant over the longer event window. 
In 2010, most of the smelting companies that sourced raw materials in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo were based in Asia and South America18 and were not traded on US 
exchanges. 
 
1.4.3  Electronics Firms 
Table 1.7 
 
                                                          
18 The largest tin smelters during the period covered in this study (according to ITRI) were : Yunnan Tin (China) 
PT Timah (Indonesia); Malaysia Smelting Corp (Malaysia); Minsur (Peru); Thaisarco (Thailand); Yunnan 
Chengfeng (China);EM Vinto (Bolivia); Liuzhou China Tin (China); Metallo Chimique (Belgium); PT Koba Tin 
(Indonesia); Gejiu Zi-Li (China); Gold Bell Group (China); OMSA (Bolivia); Taboca/Paranapanema (Brazil) 
Smelting
Equal-Weight  S&P 500 Equal-Weight S&P 500
Pass Committee -0.0212 ** -0.0269 *** -0.0137 ** -0.0168 ***
N=44 (.0058) (.0059) (.0045) (.0046)
Added to Dodd-Frank 0.0058 0.0062 0.0007 0.0170 ***
N=44 (.0048) (.005) (.0044) (.0048)
Kabila Announce -0.0181 ** -0.0214 *** -0.0061 -0.0048
N=43 (.0061) (.0061) 0.0039 (.0039)
SEC Reg Announce 0.0122 0.0127 0.0058 0.0055
N=44 (.0067) (.0067) (.0052) (.0052)
* p<0.05;  ** p<0.01;  *** p<0.001 (Robust Standard Errors)
Avg. Cum. Abnormal (5 day %) Avg. Cum. Abnormal (3 day %)
Electronics Mnf
Equal-Weight  S&P 500 Equal-Weight S&P 500
Pass Committee 0.0008 -0.0033 0.0041 0.0019
N=478 (.0037) (.0037) (.0029) (.0029)
Added to Dodd-Frank -0.0019 0.0003 -0.0042 * 0.0068 ***
N=478 (.0026) (.0026) (.002) (.0021)
Kabila Announce 0.0084 * 0.0070 * -0.0004 0.0016
N=476 (.0035) (.0035) (.003) (.003)
SEC Reg Announce -0.0063 * -0.0059 * -0.0052 * -0.0054 *
N=475 (.0029) (.0029) (.0022) (.0022)
* p<0.05;  ** p<0.01;  *** p<0.001 (Robust Standard Errors)
Avg. Cum. Abnormal (5 day %) Avg. Cum. Abnormal (3 day %)
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Electronic companies as a group did not have abnormal returns when the Conflict Minerals 
Trade Act passed in a hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and only the three-
day window was significant (with small coefficients of opposite directions for the two 
indexes) when regulators appended the measures to Dodd-Frank. President Kabila’s 
announcement coincided with significantly positive returns for electronics firms in general, 
but only over the five-day window. The SEC announcement however coincided with 
significantly negative abnormal returns for both window lengths. 
Table 1.8 
 
Communications equipment manufacturers were a specific target of many advocacy 
groups during the debate over legislation in 2009 and 2010. As was the case for other 
electronics manufacturing companies, it does not appear as though US legislation sparked a 
substantial re-evaluation of communication equipment manufacturers. However, the Kabila 
announcement coincided with a significant increase in returns for communications firms, 
while such an effect was apparent for other electronics manufacturers only over the five-
day event window and at a lower level of significance. 
The positive abnormal returns for communications equipment manufacturing during the 
Kabila announcement window are striking – across both indexes and for both window 
lengths, the returns were high around September 9th 2010.  
Communications Mnf
Equal-Weight  S&P 500 Equal-Weight S&P 500
Pass Committee 0.0035 -0.0003 -0.0031 -0.0052
N=93 (.0093) (.0093) (.0052) (.0052)
Added to Dodd-Frank -0.0078 -0.0064 -0.0110 * -0.0013
N=94 (.0071) (.0072) (.0053) (.0054)
Kabila Announce 0.0233 *** 0.0221 *** 0.0143 *** 0.0161 ***
N=94 (.0056) (.0056) (.0043) (.0043)
SEC Reg Announce -0.0079 -0.0075 -0.0088 -0.0090
N=98 (.0081) (.0082) (.0054) (.0054)
* p<0.05;  ** p<0.01;  *** p<0.001 (Robust Standard Errors)
Avg. Cum. Abnormal (5 day %) Avg. Cum. Abnormal (3 day %)
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Figure 1.2 
 
 
1.5 Discussion 
US-listed companies continued to be sensitive to changes in production of minerals in the 
DRC after Dodd-Frank became law, indicating that the direst concerns about a full embargo 
were not realized in the period immediately following the Act’s development and passage. 
However, the fact that some trade was expected to exist at some point after Dodd-Frank 
does not mean that the regulation accomplished its main goals of reducing revenue to 
militant groups, nor does it mean that the law was successful in avoiding harm to workers 
and market participants not involved in illegal activity. 
Because regulations over conflict mineral trading were scheduled to be implemented by 
the Securities and Exchange Commission some months after the conflict minerals provision 
was passed in the United States, there are several non-exclusive interpretations of market 
sensitivity to an additional ban in the DRC. Market participants could have expected trade to 
continue via regulated companies, or that trade would continue via companies outside of 
the SEC’s jurisdiction. Another explanation could be that trade was only expected to 
continue until conflict minerals rules were implemented by the SEC, or that the SEC rules 
were not expected to last long. 
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The generally positive returns for many companies that coincide with regulatory events 
in this study are a puzzle. One possible explanation however, is that regulation provides 
protection from competition for incumbent companies. 
Communication equipment manufacturing companies traded on US exchanges were 
under pressure to change their sourcing for some time prior to US legislation, and several of 
the larger companies making up that list claimed to have already removed DRC-sourced 
minerals from their supply chains. If true, the results reported here may reflect a leveling of 
the playing field between US-traded firms that were unable or unwilling to purchase 
minerals from the DRC, and those companies that, prior to reduced production in the DRC, 
were not under such pressure.  
The fact that advocacy was only effective in this way for a single subsector raises 
questions about this interpretation, however, and it is unclear why computer manufacturing 
companies did not have similar abnormal returns while occupying a similar place in the 
electronics market. While mobile devices were certainly a target for advocacy groups, it 
would be surprising if these efforts affected the market in such a narrow way. 
 
1.6 Conclusion 
Using an event study approach, I show that even after US legislation, some companies listed 
on US-exchanges were sensitive to production changes that occurred in the eastern 
Democratic Republic of the Congo. Such sensitivity likely indicates that some companies and 
market participants (whether required to report to the SEC or not) expected continued 
minerals trade with the region in the period after the US law was developed and passed, 
and before President Kabila issued a ban on conflict mineral production in the eastern DRC. 
Such an expectation suggests that the feared US-imposed ban on minerals from the eastern 
DRC did not occur in the period immediately following the successful passage of Dodd-
Frank. 
The results of the event study also show that in specific cases, an increased likelihood of 
US legislation had a detectible positive effect on companies listed on US exchanges. 
Companies in the mining and electronic communications manufacturing sectors 
experienced abnormal returns as the legislation became more likely around April 28, 2010, 
and most of these abnormal returns were positive.  
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1.8.1 Appendix A: Industry Groups which submitted implementation suggestions to the 
SEC on conflict mineral regulations 
1. Advanced Medical Technology 
Association (AdvaMed) 
2. Aerospace Industries Association 
(AIA) 
3. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld 
LLP 
4. American Apparel & Footwear 
Association 
5. American Association of Exporters 
and Importers (AAEI) 
6. American Automotive Policy 
Council (AAPC) 
7. American Gem Society 
8. American Tin Trade Association 
9. AngloGold Ashanti Limited 
10. AT&T Inc. 
11. AxamTrade 
12. Bario-Neal Jewelry 
13. Barrick Gold Corporation 
14. BC Investment Management 
Corporation 
15. Business Alliance for Customs 
Modernization (BACM) 
16. Business Roundtable 
17. Calvert Asset Management 
Company, Inc. 
18. Center for Capital Markets 
Competitiveness 
19. Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton 
LLP 
20. Communications and Information 
Network Association of Japan 
21. Competitive Enterprise Institute 
22. Consumer Electronics Association 
23. Consumer Electronics Retailers 
Coalition 
24. Copper & Brass Fabricators 
Council, Inc. 
25. CTIA-The Wireless Association 
26. Deloitte & Touche LLP 
27. Electronics TakeBack Coalition 
28. Emergency Committee for 
American Trade 
29. Information Technology Industry 
Council 
30. Ernst & Young LLP 
31. Ethical Metalsmiths 
32. Fair Jewelry Action 
33. Fair Jewelry Action USA 
34. Fashion Jewelry and Accessories 
Trade Association 
35. Federation des Enterprises du 
Congo 
36. Ford Motor Company 
37. Générale des Coopératives 
Minières du Sud Kivu (GECOMISKI) 
38. Global Tungsten & Powders Corp. 
39. Grant Thornton LLP 
40. Hacker Jewelers, Designers & 
Goldsmiths, Inc. 
41. Hoover & Strong Inc. 
42. International Precious Metals 
Institute 
43. International Trade Retail Industry 
Leaders Association   
44. Association Connecting Electronics 
Industries Joint  Industry Group 
(JIG) 
45. ITRI Ltd 
46. Japan Auto Parts Industries 
Association 
47. Japan Business Machine and 
Information System Industries 
Association 
48. Japan Electronics and Information 
Technology Industries Association 
49. Japan Machinery Center for Trade 
and Investment 
50. Jewelers of America 
51. Jewelers Vigilance Committee   
52. Joint Industry Group 
53. KPMG LLP 
54. London Bullion Market Association 
55. Malaysia Smelting Corporation 
56. Manufacturing Jewelers & 
Suppliers of America 
57. Materials Management Corp. 
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58. Medtronic, Inc. 
59. Metal Solutions Corporation 
60. Metalor Technologies USA 
61. Mining Industry Associations of 
Southern Africa 
62. Minister of Energy and Minerals, 
United Republic of Tanzania 
63. Minister of Energy and Mines, 
Republic of Burundi 
64. Ministre des Mines, République 
Démocratique du Congo 
65. MJB Consulting 
66. Moore & Van Allen PLLC 
67. National Association of 
Manufacturers (NAM) 
68. National Electrical Manufacturers 
Association (NEMA)  
69. National Foreign Trade Council 
(NFTC) 
70. National Mining Association 
71. National Oilwell Varco 
72. National Retail Federation (NRF) 
73. National Stone, Sand Gravel 
Association 
74. NEI Investments 
75. Newmont Mining Corporation 
76. Niotan, Inc. 
77. North Kivu Artisanal Mining 
Cooperatives 
78. Ohio Precious Metals LLC 
79. Personal Care Products Council 
80. Plexus 
81. Refractory Metals Association 
82. Responsible Jewellery Council 
83. Retail Industry Leaders Association 
(RILA) 
84. Rockefeller Financial Asset 
Management 
85. Semiconductor Equipment and 
Materials International (SEMI) 
86. Semiconductor Industry 
Association 
87. Specialty Steel Industry of North 
America 
88. Taiwan Semiconductor 
Manufacturing Company, Ltd. 
89. Tantalum-Niobium International 
Study Center 
90. Tanzanian Chamber of Minerals 
and Energy 
91. TechAmerica 
92. The Elm Consulting Group 
International LLC 
93. The Japan Electrical 
Manufacturers’ Association 
94. The Kuala Lumpur Tin Market 
95. TIAA-CREF 
96. Tiffany & Co. 
97. TriQuint Semiconductor 
98. U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
99. United States Steel Corporation 
United States Telecom Association 
100. USA Engage 
101. Vale S.A. 
102. Verizon Communications 
103. World Gold Council
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Chapter II 
Stock Market Reactions to Conflict Diamond Trading 
Restrictions and Controversies 
 
 
 
 
In this study, I explore the reactions of financial market participants to news relating 
to the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), a body that regulates aspects 
of global diamond production and trade. I use an event study approach with data on 
the returns for shares of leading global mining and jewelry retail companies over the 
period from 1999 to 2011. 
 
I show that the most influential dates related to the KPCS for diamond mining 
companies were associated with regulatory actions in the early 2000s taken by the 
United Nations and the United States. These events were associated with lower 
returns for diamond mining companies. After 2004, jewelry companies experienced 
abnormal returns coinciding with KPCS-related events, while mining firms appear 
rarely affected by events during this time. The majority of returns for jewelry 
companies were negative for events which called into question the ability of the 
KPCS to ensure conflict-free diamond production and trade. Expanded legal 
diamond production in some cases coincided with positive returns for jewelry retail 
companies over the time period I consider. 
 
These results are consistent with the expectation that jewelry companies, which 
often market directly to consumers, are more sensitive to public perception 
concerning the KPCS and its credibility. The results are inconsistent with the point of 
view that the creation of the KPCS was seen by financial market participants as 
“good news” overall for diamond mining companies. The results also suggest that 
once trade restrictions were in place, mining companies were less affected by 
controversies surrounding the credibility of the KPCS.  
 
JEL Classification: F51, Q34, Q37 
Keywords: Diamonds, Natural Resources, Trade Regulation, Event Study, Kimberley Process  
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2.1 Introduction 
In 1998, the non-governmental organization (NGO) Global Witness launched an awareness 
campaign against “blood diamonds”, publicizing the link between diamond production and 
armed conflict. Not long after, Robert Fowler and a UN panel of experts submitted a report to 
the UN Security Council detailing the ways in which armed groups evaded sanctions in Angola – 
which was at that time embroiled in a long-running civil war (UN Panel of Experts, 2000). The 
report discussed the role of diamonds in funding the armed group Uniao Nacional Para a 
Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA), and provided evidence of actors in the diamond mining 
and jewelry industries evading UN sanctions. 
Also bringing attention to illicit diamond trading in the late 1990s were the brutal tactics of 
the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) during the civil war in Sierra Leone, which drew global  
condemnation and resulted in a United Nations Security Council ban on the trade of all 
diamonds originating in that country.19 
Later that year, the UN Security Council passed a resolution supporting the creation of a 
global certification procedure for diamonds.20 The ultimate multinational response brought 
about the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), a control and certification body that 
came into force in 2003 in Interlaken, Switzerland. The KPCS guidelines left individual state 
members to draft and pass the requisite legislation, and to monitor companies and individuals 
operating within their jurisdictions.  
The KPCS grew to cover 76 represented countries by early 2012 (Kimberley Process, 2012). 
This group included all major diamond producing countries (covering 99.8% of global rough 
diamond production), and involved the majority of large national consumer markets. Also 
represented in KPCS were advocacy and industry observers, including Global Witness and De 
Beers, the world’s largest diamond mining company. Member states agreed to trade diamonds 
solely with other member countries, and to halt trade with members who were suspended for 
violating KPCS rules. The Kimberley Process also required that a KPCS certificate accompany 
every compliant diamond sold on the international market. 
                                                          
19 Resolution 1306 on 5 July, 2000 
20 UN Resolution 56/263 
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Industry actors participated in the development and promulgation of KPCS-recommended 
policies, as well as many aspects of the scheme’s implementation. This industry involvement 
proved to be a contentious issue among academics, politicians, business leaders and advocacy 
organizations, but many KPCS advocates eventually saw the involvement as a means of 
providing incentives for companies to comply with KPCS regulations. Many saw the system as 
benefiting the diamond industry by protecting its reputation against charges of supporting 
violence in diamond producing countries. 
The World Diamond Council, a global industry body formed in 2000 to address regulatory 
drives against conflict diamonds, eventually voted to support the creation of the Kimberley 
Process. The move prompted many to claim that trade restrictions against violent groups in 
smaller countries would benefit large-scale diamond mining companies, and that the primary 
motivation of companies for supporting the initiative was to gain advantages in the market: 
“…this new international system restricts supply and enhances the power of big, 
established players. It keeps the warlords and the small diggers and the shady 
traders out of the acceptable stream of commerce. It also imposes costs (for tagging, 
monitoring and auditing) that make it even more difficult for new or smaller players 
to enter the global market.” (Spar, 2006) 
Haufler (2009) proposes that the majority of industries targeted by advocacy groups in 
recent years are not as ideal for KPCS-type regulations because the diamond industry is more 
concentrated than other industries. Haufler claims that benefits do indeed accrue to mining and 
retail jewelry companies in the diamond industry, but argues that these are peculiarities of the 
industry, rather than a guide for future efforts. The literature on sanctions, including the most 
commonly cited theoretical model from Kaempher and Lowenberg (1992)21, also suggests that 
restrictions are more likely when there is industry support in the sending country due to local 
benefits from regulations. 
If the KPCS were mostly beneficial for incumbent companies as these, and other scholars 
have argued, we should expect investors and other market participants to have re-evaluated 
companies in a positive light due to new information about the likelihood of regulations. If the 
                                                          
21 Please see Appendix A for a discussion of the Kaempher and Lowenberg (1992) model. 
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companies were publicly traded, we would also expect that the returns on securities of these 
companies would increase if there were good news about the prospects of the industry.  
Using such an approach in another context however, La Ferrara and Guidolin (2007) show 
that in some cases, violent conflicts can benefit diamond mining companies. La Ferrara and 
Guidolin use micro-level data to demonstrate that the exogenous shock of the death of the 
rebel leader in Angola (and subsequent end of the conflict there) was interpreted as “bad 
news” for diamond mining companies with activities in the country, corresponding with a 4 per 
cent decrease in abnormal returns. The authors interpret this result as indicating that aspects of 
armed conflicts such as the weakening of state power and the increase in barriers to entry can 
benefit some stakeholders. Insofar as incumbent companies did in fact benefit from conflict 
situations, we should expect that credible regulations to ensure that diamonds produced in 
conflict environments do not reach markets would harm some mining interests. 
Taking this debate as a starting point for the analysis of the effects of the near-global 
regulations on companies in the diamond industry, there are several critical questions that have 
not been conclusively answered in the literature: 
1) Did the KPCS have real effects on the diamond industry? 
2) If so, do events and policy decisions related to the KPCS continue to be 
relevant? 
3) Again if the KPCS has measurable effects on the diamond industry, what was 
the direction of these effects and did the regulations benefit specific 
segments of the industry?  
To anticipate the findings in this study, I show that the development and implementation of 
the KPCS had significant impacts on the returns on shares for companies in the diamond 
industry. I also show that the majority of abnormal returns related to the creation of the KPCS 
were negative for mining companies globally. Moreover, I show that some retail jewelry 
companies appear to have been negatively impacted by events which called into question the 
credibility of the Process. These results suggest that the KPCS was expected to have substantial 
effects on mining companies that were not unconditionally beneficial for them, and that 
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regulation likely created incentives for retail jewelry companies to maintain the credibility of 
the Process. 
I proceed as follows: Section 2.2 describes the event study methodology I employ. Section 
2.3 describes the data I use in the analysis, and Section 2.4 describes the results. Having 
established that returns were indeed significantly abnormal, in Section 2.5 I turn to a discussion 
and interpretation of the main findings. Section 2.6 concludes. 
 
2.2 Event Study Methodology 
Event studies focus on the “event window” — the period of time during which investors learn 
about the event that is under study. In the following sections, I predict returns for securities 
during a given event window using estimates from an “estimation window” — an extended 
period prior to the event — using ordinary least squares regression. I then compare the 
predicted returns to actual returns to measure the degree to which returns during the event 
window were abnormal in comparison the expected performance of the security. 
The event study approach is based on the assumptions of the constant expected return 
model (CER)22 that, as a regression model, is expressed: 
                                                                                     
        
          
                                                                       
   (       )  {
       
        
                                                                
The term     is the return on security   at time    and    is expected return. The error term     
in the expression is a Gaussian white noise (GWN) process.  
As applied to event studies, a standard formulation of the regression model emphasizes the 
specific time period during which an event of interest took place, and that expected returns are 
related to market-wide returns. The regression model can therefore be adapted to read: 
                                                          
22(a) Covariance stationary and ergodicity:                     
  is a covariance stationary and ergodic stochastic 
process with  [   ]    ,            
 ,                  , and                  
(b) Normality:            
   for all   and   
(c) No serial correlation:                              for     and             
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             ∑     
  
   
                                               
Where     is again the return on security   at time   and     is the systematic risk for 
security  . The term    refers to the market return for the security exchange on which   trades, 
and     is again a stochastic error term with a mean equal to zero and variance   
 . The dummy 
variable     is equal to one during the event window and zero otherwise, and    is equal to the 
number of days of the event window. The term    accounts for the difference between the 
actual return and the predicted return, which is usually referred to as the “abnormal return” in 
event studies. 
In the following analysis, I look at an event window of several days because “news” or 
information about the value of a security does not circulate instantaneously for all market 
participants. The full effect of the event is a summation of the daily abnormal returns over the 
event window, which is referred to as the cumulative abnormal return or CAR:23 
      ∑  ̂  
  
   
                                                                                    
Under normal circumstances, the expected CAR should be equal to zero.24 A statistically 
significant shift away from expected returns however, signifies that new information has 
caused a re-evaluation: 
 
   ∑      
     
                                                                                 
   ∑      
     
                                                                                  
 
Most trade restrictions do not affect all companies in the same way, as regulations could be 
beneficial for some companies (leading to a positive CAR) and harmful for others (leading to a 
                                                          
23This is often expressed in the event study literature as simply the error term ϵ summed over the event window, 
rather than the defining the abnormal portion alongside a separate error term 
24 Implied by (1)                 [   ], the term     is defined as the deviation of the random return from its 
expected value 
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negative CAR). The two types could be defined as those companies that would be expected to 
benefit from regulations (   ), and those that would be expected to be harmed (   ) by 
regulations. Rewriting the null and alternate hypotheses, the approach is expressed: 
 
   ∑      
     
                                                                                 
   ∑      
     
{
                           
                           
                            
And: 
   ∑      
     
                                                                                   
   ∑      
     
{
                           
                           
                             
 
As in     , both      and       state that the expected CAR=0. But in this more explicit 
statement of the null and alternate hypotheses, the same event could characterize opposite 
impacts depending on the company type. 
 
2.3 Data 
The historical stock returns I use in the following analysis are publicly available. To compare 
performance, I pair stock returns with a national index from the country where the exchange is 
located. Table 2.1 lists the indexes I use in the following analysis. 
Table 2.1 
 
Index Symbol % total
India Stocks Total Return Index TRINDSTM 14.73
Dow Jones Canada Stock Index _CA1 31.12
Dow Jones Australian Index _DJAU 10.13
Dow Jones U.S. Total Stock Market Total Return Index (Full-Cap) _DWCTD 14.53
Dow Jones Europe Stock Index (Excl UK) _E23 7.6
Ftse-100 Value Stock Index _FTUKXVD 6.06
Dow Jones Hong Kong Stock Index _HK1 8.3
Dow Jones New Zealand Stock Index USD _NZ2 1.45
Dow Jones Singapore Stock Index _SG1 6.09
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To select diamond mining companies to evaluate, I use a full list of active publically traded 
diamond mining companies listed by miningfeeds.com, a popular mining industry website. For 
retail jewelry companies, I use a list of publically traded companies on major global stock 
exchanges from Yahoo Finance on April 24, 2012.25 
In some respects, companies that sell diamonds have similar interests to upstream firms, 
such as diamond mining companies. Although both company types take part in some trade 
groups and joint lobbying, their concerns are not always identical, and in the following analysis, 
I provide results for jewelry and mining firms separately. 
The event dates included in the analysis through the year 2007 are based on a list created by 
diamondfacts.org, a website sponsored by the World Diamond Council (World Diamond Coucil, 
2012). I supplement this list for dates after 2007 with important actions regarding the KPCS 
which were recorded in major newspapers and news services, including the New York Times 
and Reuters.26  
 
2.4 Results 
Below I list event dates with at least one event window showing significant abnormal returns. 
Although there are many ambiguous dates (where statistical significance depends on the length 
of the event window), several are clearly significant over both event window lengths and 
immediately stand out.  
On the 5th of July, 2000, the UN Security Council imposed a worldwide ban on diamonds 
from Sierra Leone. Although fewer large-scale producers were involved in the primarily alluvial 
diamond mining operations present in Sierra Leone at that time, mining companies posted 
abnormally negative returns coinciding with the Security Council ban, and while smaller, the dip 
in returns for jewelry firms nears statistical significance over the three-day event window. 
In the United States, the Act of Congress that brought the country into compliance with the 
KPCS was considered in several forms before a final version passed. The first version, H.R.1584, 
was proposed in the US House of Representatives on March 7th, 2001. The abnormal returns for 
                                                          
25 A full list of companies used in the following analysis is included in Appendix B. 
26 A full list of dates used in the following analysis is included in Appendix C. 
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diamond mining and jewelry companies during the event windows corresponding to this date 
were insignificantly different from zero. The introduction of a second version on April 3rd, 2003 
similarly did not provoke a significant reaction in stock markets. When the Clean Diamonds Act 
passed in the US Senate on April 10th of 2003, however, returns on securities for diamond 
mining companies significantly declined over both the three- and five-day event windows. 
Likewise, when US President George W. Bush signed the Clean Diamond Trade Act27 into law on 
the 24th of April, 2003, and formally brought the United States into KPCS compliance, mining 
firms recorded statistically significant negative returns over both the three- and five-day event 
windows. 
The UN Security Council banned diamonds from Côte d'Ivoire on the 15th of December, 2005, 
in response to violence in that country.28 Jewelry companies had abnormally negative returns 
over the three- and five-day event windows coinciding with this event, while mining companies 
showed no statistically significant change. When Ian Smillie, a leading conflict diamond expert 
and prominent designer of the KPCS, quit the Kimberley Process in a strongly worded letter on 
the 10th of June, 2009, mining companies appeared to have no statistically significant abnormal 
returns while jewelry companies recorded significantly negative returns over both event 
window lengths. 
On the 10th of December, 2010, newspapers in Europe and North America first reported 
Wikileaks cables that detailed human rights violations in the Marange diamond fields in eastern 
Zimbabwe. Although diamond mining companies had no statistically significant change in 
returns around this time, jewelry companies again saw strongly negative returns over both 
event window lengths. A few months later on the 21st of March, 2011, the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo’s chairperson Mathieu Yamba Lapfa Lambang unilaterally authorized diamond 
exports from Zimbabwe, despite vocal opposition from other members, including the US, 
several EU member states, and Canada. Jewelry companies had significantly positive returns 
during the windows coinciding with this event, while mining companies saw no statistically 
significant deviation from predicted returns. 
                                                          
27 H.R. 1584 (108th) 
28 Resolution 1643 (2005) Adopted by the Security Council at its 5327th meeting 
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Event Date Description N 3-day 5-day
4 0.012 0.030 **
(0.010) (0.008)
8 -0.044 -0.035
(0.025) (0.031)
8 0.036 0.006
(0.025) (0.012)
8 -0.054 -0.066
(0.058) (0.059)
8 -0.034 -0.033
(0.044) (0.046)
8 0.054 ** 0.049 **
(0.023) (0.020)
8 -0.014 -0.039 *
(0.012) (0.019)
10 -0.007 -0.043
(0.040) (0.054)
14 -0.025 * -0.027 *
(0.013) (0.013)
24 0.014 0.014
(0.016) (0.016)
23 -0.036 -0.037
(0.027) (0.027)
25 0.001 -0.006
(0.021) (0.021)
27 -0.021 * -0.023 *
(0.010) (0.012)
28 -0.022 *** -0.022 ***
(0.006) (0.006)
29 -0.002 -0.003
(0.007) (0.007)
31 -0.017 ** -0.009
(0.007) (0.006)
39 0.008 0.025 **
(0.010) (0.012)
38 -0.020 0.037 **
(0.019) (0.017)
40 -0.032 *** -0.050 ***
(0.012) (0.014)
41 0.017 * 0.014
(0.009) (0.009)
43 -0.034 *** -0.023 *
(0.011) (0.013)
43 0.013 * 0.023 *
(0.006) (0.012)
03-Oct-99 Major press release published
04-Sep-00
A meeting of 50 delegates from all  major diamond 
producing & importing countries
05-Jul-00
UNSC votes to impose world-wide ban on 
diamonds from Sierra Leone
16-Jul-00
29th World Diamond Congress meets the 16th to 
the 19th of July, creates World Diamond Council
14-Feb-01
70 US-based NGOs launched the Campaign to 
Eliminate Conflict Diamonds
20-Feb-01 Israeli diamond banks issue notice to clients
18-Mar-02 Kimberly Process meeting in Canada
11-Sep-01 Participant meeting in UK
13-Feb-03 UK diamond office opened
24-Apr-03 Bush signs HR 1584, making US KP compliant
29-Oct-04
The participants of the Kimberley Process met in 
Plenary in Gatineau, Quebec
01-Jan-04 Canada Appointed chair of KP
10-Mar-06
Report on Brazil, claiming roughly half of diamond 
exports are not accounted for
15-Dec-05 UNSC votes to impose global ban on Ivory Coast
10-Dec-10
Wikileaks information on atrocities in Zimbabwe 
fields reported
10-Dec-08
The World Diamond Council (WDC) calls for crack 
down on  Zimbabwe
Jewelry Companies
10-Jun-09 Ian Smill ie quits Kimberley Process 
22-May-07
The WDC accuses Zimbabwe and Venezuala for 
fail ing to cooperate with KPCS
16-Mar-09 High-level envoy visit by KP chair to Zimbabwe
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1, (Robust Standard Errors)
10-Apr-03 Senate Passes Clean Diamonds Act
21-Mar-11
Mathieu Lapfa unilaterally authorizes Zimbabwe 
exports
03-Jun-10
Arrest of Farai Maguwu for investigating human 
rights violations
Table 2.2 
 38 
 
 
 
Event Date description N 3-day 5-day
12 0.056 0.099
(0.057) (0.068)
12 -0.069 *** -0.097 ***
(0.021) (0.027)
13 -0.024 * -0.018
(0.013) (0.035)
13 -0.020 -0.053 **
(0.013) (0.019)
13 0.052 * 0.049
(0.025) (0.027)
13 -0.033 -0.037
(0.034) (0.025)
14 0.008 -0.048
(0.018) (0.033)
14 0.003 -0.036 *
(0.022) (0.019)
15 0.072 0.064
(0.062) (0.063)
18 -0.020 * -0.027 *
(0.011) (0.016)
18 -0.030 * -0.036 *
(0.016) (0.017)
18 -0.026 -0.033 *
(0.018) (0.017)
19 -0.016 -0.002
(0.014) (0.015)
19 -0.015 -0.016
(0.014) (0.014)
19 -0.025 -0.043 **
(0.014) (0.019)
22 -0.014 -0.017
(0.014) (0.020)
27 0.069 0.022
(0.044) (0.044)
27 -0.039 -0.023
(0.063) (0.055)
27 0.043 0.048
(0.038) (0.043)
27 -0.018 -0.035
(0.021) (0.026)
27 -0.005 0.009
(0.013) (0.020)
30 0.002 0.012
(0.010) (0.018)
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1, (Robust Standard Errors)
10-Apr-03 Senate Passes Clean Diamonds Act
21-Mar-11
Mathieu Lapfa unilaterally authorizes Zimbabwe 
exports
Mining Companies
10-Jun-09 Ian Smill ie quits Kimberley Process 
03-Jun-10
Arrest of Farai Maguwu for investigating human 
rights violations
22-May-07
The WDC accuses Zimbabwe and Venezuala for 
fail ing to cooperate with KPCS
16-Mar-09 High-level envoy visit by KP chair to Zimbabwe
10-Dec-10
Wikileaks information on atrocities in Zimbabwe 
fields reported
10-Dec-08
The World Diamond Council (WDC) calls for crack 
down on  Zimbabwe
10-Mar-06
Report on Brazil, claiming roughly half of diamond 
exports are not accounted for
15-Dec-05 UNSC votes to impose global ban on Ivory Coast
29-Oct-04
The participants of the Kimberley Process met in 
Plenary in Gatineau, Quebec
01-Jan-04 Canada Appointed chair of KP
13-Feb-03 UK diamond office opened
24-Apr-03 Bush signs HR 1584, making US KP compliant
18-Mar-02 Kimberly Process meeting in Canada
11-Sep-01 Participant meeting in UK
14-Feb-01
70 US-based NGOs launched the Campaign to 
Eliminate Conflict Diamonds
20-Feb-01 Israeli diamond banks issue notice to clients
04-Sep-00
A meeting of 50 delegates from all  major diamond 
producing & importing countries
05-Jul-00
UNSC votes to impose world-wide ban on 
diamonds from Sierra Leone
16-Jul-00
29th World Diamond Congress creates World 
Diamond Council
03-Oct-99 Major press release published
Table 2.3 
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2.5  Analysis 
None of the statistically significant events studied in this analysis affected both jewelry and 
diamond mining companies at the same time and in the same direction, which suggests that the 
interests of the two company types with respect to regulations and markets were more 
separate over the issues investigated here than expected.  
The events that most affected diamond mining companies appear to be related to 
regulations at the national or UN-level.29 Both the Security Council decision to ban diamonds 
exported from Sierra Leone and the events corresponding to United States ratification of KPCS-
compliant legislation drove down returns for diamond mining companies. Over the three-day 
event window for the ban on Sierra Leone, cumulative returns for mining companies were 
nearly 7% below expected performance, and nearly 9% below over the five-day window. 
Passage of the Act from the US Senate corresponded with a 2.4% lower than expected return 
over the three-day window, 2.7% over the five-day window. Final US ratification corresponded 
with returns that were 3.2% lower than expected over a three-day window and 3.8% lower 
than expected over the five-day window. 
These results suggest that overall the KPCS was not expected to help diamond mining 
companies, as some analysts suggest. This does not preclude the possibility that protection 
from competition benefited some firms in some respects, but as a whole the regulations were 
not looked as “good news” for diamond mining companies.  
                                                          
29 One event that may coincide with a report on the failure of the KPCS in Brazil approaches significance over the 
3-day window and is significant over the 5-day window. The results are in large part driven by a single company 
however, Mountain Lake Resources Inc., which did not have any diamond production in Brazil. 
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Figure 2.1 
 
This result could arise due to several factors, or a combination of them. The KPCS regulations 
could entail a high cost of implementation, and the laws could have been expected to place 
higher cost on companies operating in developed countries (which are more likely to be traded 
on exchanges) than in less-developed economies. Another possibility is that some diamond 
mining companies did well by operating in the circumstances surrounding armed conflicts, as La 
Ferrara and Guidolin (2007) suggest was the case in Angola.  
Retail jewelry companies however were more sensitive to events that could impact the retail 
demand for diamonds. Although not all such events were significant for jewelry companies, 
those events that were significant and positive were most often those that supported the 
credibility of the KPCS, whereas those which were negative undermined that credibility. For 
example, when Ian Smillie left the KPCS, jewelry retail companies experienced significantly 
lower than expected returns. Likewise, when Wikileaks cables revealed that diamonds that 
were certified as conflict-free had in fact been sourced in an area experiencing armed conflict, 
jewelry retailers again experienced lower than expected returns. These are the results one 
would expect were jewelry companies expected to benefit more from a KPCS program that was 
seen as credible. 
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Figure 2.2 
 
Other cases which seemed to benefit jewelry retail companies were events which opened 
competition in the market for diamond production and vice versa. When the UN Security 
Council banned diamonds from Côte d'Ivoire, returns were abnormally low for jewelry retailers, 
perhaps reflecting the reduction of competition in diamond production. 
Figure 2.3 
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When Mathieu Yamba Lapfa Lambang, Chair of the KPCS in 2011, unilaterally opened up 
Zimbabwe diamond exports, jewelry retailers appear to have benefited from this unanticipated 
event. Both over the shorter and longer event windows, abnormal returns were positive and 
statistically significant. This may reflect the increased bargaining power retailers were expected 
to have with more producers entering the market. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
For mining companies, the most influential dates on returns related to governmental and 
regulatory actions in the early 2000s from both the UN and US. Trade restrictions on diamonds 
appear to have negatively affected mining companies in ways not felt in the rest of the 
diamond industry. After 2004, jewelry companies, a group that in general is much closer to end 
consumers on the supply chain, felt the effects of KPCS-related events much more than mining 
companies, which appear hardly affected by KPCS-related events during this time. This may 
indicate that the more image-driven portion of the market was more sensitive to the 
perceptions of consumers surrounding the KPCS and its implementation. 
The results also indicate that although diamond-mining companies appear less likely to be 
affected by KPCS-related events, jewelry companies experienced statistically significant 
abnormal returns as recently as 2011. Although the KPCS has been criticized as no longer 
significant, it appears that in some circumstances the organization’s reputation and decisions 
matter for companies in the industry. 
Mining and jewelry companies worked together to form the World Diamond Council and 
other bodies during the initial implementation of KPCS rules, and the two company types were 
represented in KPCS proceedings thereafter. This analysis shows, however, that the interests of 
the two company types are not always, or even usually, coincidental. Although there are no 
examples reported here where abnormal returns for jewelry firms can be shown to significantly 
move in the opposite direction as those of diamond mining companies, there were no examples 
of significantly positive (or negative) abnormal returns for both company types at the same 
time. 
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2.8.1 Appendix A: Interest Groups and the Kaempher and Lowenberg model 
In the Kaempher and Lowenberg (1992) model, interest groups are formed based upon 
common interests, and the perspective of a group can be considered as a single utility-
maximizing unit. Individual   is a member of population   and maximizes utility according to: 
         (    ) , where  
   , and   
    
                    , and          
Income for individual   is   , and    is the individual’s initial endowment. The term     is a 
non-negative and continuous variable which describes the level of sanctions that are applied to 
another state or group of economic actors. The model assumes that individuals maximize 
utility, which is a function of their income, but also a function of sanctions.  
Kaempher and Lowenberg proceed by splitting the population into three types          , 
and considering representatives of each of these groups             . Each member is 
assumed to have a different reaction to the costs of sanctions;   
      
    and   
     so 
that for   income increases with sanctions against another country, for   income decreases with 
sanctions against another country, and for   income is unaffected. 
Because the interests of the  ’s and the  ’s are opposed, the two groups are assumed to be 
willing to pay for additional (or reduced) sanctions in the bargaining process, up until the point 
that paying more will leave their group with less utility than the sanction being implemented 
(or not implemented): 
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Equating the two clears the political market for sanctions if, by assumption, there are no 
deadweight losses in the initial bargaining process,30 and for small changes around     the 
marginal utilities of all individuals, regardless of their groups, are identical. The term    is the 
unit price of sanctions, which are relevant to both the  ’s and the ’s. The  ’s are willing to pay 
some price to have sanctions put into place, and the ’s are willing to pay some price to keep 
sanctions from increasing.31 The market for sanctions then depends on the degree to which the 
individuals of each group are willing to pay in their support of or opposition to sanctions. 
Crucially, group   can shift the equilibrium point, and has more utility in the case that 
sanctions are put in place but not due to income effects. This implies that alliances between  s 
(such as NGOs), and  s (such as un-sanctioned firms) could overwhelm sanction detractors or 
targets, causing redistribution away from the no sanction equilibrium and towards benefiting 
non-sanctioned producers. 
  
                                                          
30 Meaning that the sum of all incomes is exactly the same regardless of bargaining outcome 
31 To consider free riding problems we could include: Another feature of this type of competition is free riding, as 
everybody of the same type has an incentive to signal a lower willingness to pay than they actually have. 
        
              ;           
             
   And    are shift parameters which are meant to reflect the free riding that will occur in both of the groups. 
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2.8.2 Appendix B 
 
Company ticker Index
Stornoway Diamond Corp. SWY.TO _CA1
BHP Billiton plc BLT.L _FTUKXVD
Rio Tinto Ltd. RIO.AX _DJAU
Anglo American plc AAL.L _FTUKXVD
Harry Winston Diamond Corp. HW.TO _CA1
Mountain Province Diamonds Inc. MPV.TO _CA1
Lucara Diamond Corp. LUCRF.PK _DWCTD
Gem Diamonds Limited GEMD.L _FTUKXVD
Shore Gold Inc. SGF.TO _CA1
Peregrine Diamonds Ltd. PGD.TO _CA1
Firestone Diamonds plc FRDIF.PK _DWCTD
Northern Superior Resources Inc. SUP.V _CA1
Olivut Resources Ltd. OLV.V _CA1
Mwana Africa PLC MWNAF.PK _DWCTD
Williams Creek Gold Limited WCX.V _CA1
Tawana Resources NL TAW.AX _DJAU
North Australian Diamonds Ltd. NAD.AX _DJAU
Metalex Ventures Ltd. MTX.V _CA1
Tsodilo Resources Ltd. TSD.V _CA1
Diamcor Mining Inc. DMI.V _CA1
Vaaldiam Mining Inc. VAA.TO _CA1
Rimfire Pacific Mining NL RIM.AX _DJAU
Integra Gold Corp. KALRF.PK _DWCTD
Rockwell Diamonds Inc. RDI.TO _CA1
True North Gems Inc. TGX.V _CA1
Paramount Mining Corp. PCP.AX _DJAU
Firms
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Company ticker Index
Lonrho Mining Limited LOM.AX _DJAU
Mountain Lake Resources Inc. MOA.V _CA1
Venus Metals Corp. Limited VMC.AX _DJAU
Shear Diamonds Ltd. SRM.V _CA1
Aspial Corporation Limited A30.SI _SG1
Birks & Mayors Inc. BMJ _DWCTD
Blue Nile Inc. NILE _DWCTD
Cash Converters CCVU.L _FTUKXVD
Charles & Colvard Ltd. CTHR _DWCTD
Chow Sang Sang Holdings 0116.HK _HK1
Christian Dior SA CDI.PA _E23
Coach, Inc. COY.BE _E23
Compagnie Financiere RITB.DE _E23
Continental Holdings Ltd. 0513.HK _HK1
Cortina Holdings Limted C41.SI _SG1
Damiani DMN.MI _E23
DGSE Companies Inc. DGSE _DWCTD
Dickson Concepts 0113.HK _HK1
Emperor Watch & Jewellery 0887.HK _HK1
Fuqi International, Inc. 3F6A.DE _E23
Gems TV Holdings Limited AM3.SI _SG1
Gitanjali Gems Ltd. GITANJALI.BO TRINDSTM
Goldiam International Ltd. GOLDIAM.NS TRINDSTM
Hermes International RMS.PA _E23
Hour Glass Limited E5P.SI _SG1
Joyas International E9L.SI _SG1
Firms Continued
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Company ticker Index
Larry Jewelry 8351.HK _HK1
Laser Diamonds Ltd LADIAMO.BO TRINDSTM
LVMH Moet Hennessy Louis LVMH.MI _E23
Michael Hill Interna MHI.NZ _NZ2
Ming Fung Jewellery Group Ltd. 0860.HK _HK1
Noble Jewelry Holdings Ltd. 0475.HK _HK1
Nuvel Holdings, Inc. NUVL.OB _DWCTD
Parekh Platinum Ltd. PAREKHPLA.NS TRINDSTM
PPR PP.MI _E23
Rajesh Exports Ltd. RAJESHEXP.NS TRINDSTM
RCG Corporation Limited RCG.AX _DJAU
Renaissance Jewellery Ltd. RJL.BO TRINDSTM
Second Chance Properties 528.SI _SG1
Shrenuj & Company Ltd. SHRENUJ.NS TRINDSTM
Signet Jewelers Limited SIG _DWCTD
Suashish Diamonds Ltd. SUASHDIM.BO TRINDSTM
Sunraj Diamond Exports Ltd. SUNRAJDI.BO TRINDSTM
Surana Corporation Ltd SURANACOR.NS TRINDSTM
Swarnsarita Gems Ltd SHYAMST.BO TRINDSTM
Thangamayil Jewellery Ltd THANGAMAY.NS TRINDSTM
Tiffany & Co. TIF _DWCTD
Titan Industries Ltd. TITAN.BO TRINDSTM
Tse Sui Luen Jewellery 0417.HK _HK1
Vaibhav Gems Ltd. VAIBHAVG.BO TRINDSTM
Zale Corporation ZLC _DWCTD
Firms Continued
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2.8.3 Appendix C 
 
  
Event Description Event Date
Major press release published 03-Oct-99
First meeting to organize KP 11-May-00
UN Security Council votes to impose world-wide ban on 
diamonds from Sierra Leone
05-Jul-00
29th World Diamond Congress meets , creates World 
Diamond Council
16-Jul-00
A meeting of over 50 delegates 04-Sep-00
First meeting of the WDC, mandate to curtail  conflict 
diamonds
07-Sep-00
Seventy US-based NGOs launch the Campaign to Eliminate 
Conflict Diamonds
14-Feb-01
Israeli diamond banks issue notice to clients 20-Feb-01
First Version of Clean Diamonds Act 07-Mar-01
Kimberley Process intergovernmental group meets 25-Apr-01
UN Resolution 1343 Regarding Liberia automatically goes 
into effect
07-May-01
Participants meet in Moscow, propose minimum standarts 03-Jul-01
Participant meeting in UK 11-Sep-01
Participants meet in Luanda, Angola 30-Oct-01
Kimberley Process meets in Gaborone, Botswana, agree to 
minimum standards
26-Nov-01
WDC adopts system of warranties in Milan 13-Mar-02
Kimberly Process meeting in Canada 18-Mar-02
Full Candidate Event List
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Event Description Event Date
European Commission releases 1st draft of Council 
regulation on implementing KPCS
18-Jul-02
Adoption the international certification scheme 04-Nov-02
KPCS enters force, US and UK issued grace period; South 
Africa appointed chair of KP
01-Jan-03
UK diamond office opened 13-Feb-03
Second Version of Clean Diamonds Act 03-Apr-03
Senate Passes Clean Diamonds Act 10-Apr-03
Bush signs HR 1584, making USA KP compliant 24-Apr-03
The Kimberley Process convened for a plenary meeting in 
Johannesburg
30-Apr-03
full implementation, only compliant countries can trade 
with one another
01-May-03
UN lifts restriction on exports of diamonds from Sierra 
Leone
04-Jun-03
Monitoring meeting 20-Oct-03
Canada Appointed chair of KP 01-Jan-04
Republic of Congo Suspended 09-Jul-04
The participants of the Kimberley Process meet in 
Gatineau, Quebec
29-Oct-04
Russia appointed chair 01-Jan-05
Ivory Coast suspended 17-Nov-05
Full Candidate Event List Continued
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Event Description Event Date
UN Security Council votes to impose world-wide ban on 
diamonds from Ivory Coast
15-Dec-05
Botswana assumes chair 01-Jan-06
Report on Brazil, claiming roughly half of diamond exports 
are not accounted for
10-Mar-06
The WDC accuses Zimbabwe and Venezuala of fail ing to 
cooperate with the KP
22-May-07
The WDC calls for cracking down on the trade of i l legal 
diamonds from Zimbabwe
10-Dec-08
KP chair visits Zimbabwe 16-Mar-09
Ian Smill ie quits Kimberley Process 10-Jun-09
Zimbabwe reported as set to receive approval 28-May-10
Farai Maguwu, human rights violations investigator, 
arrested in Zimbabwe
03-Jun-10
Farai Maguwu freed 12-Jul-10
Meeting in St. Petersberg allows sales of diamonds from 
Marange, Zimbabwe
15-Jul-10
Zimbabwe began selling diamonds mined from an area 
where soldiers are accused of human rights violations
11-Aug-10
Second public diamond auction in Zimbabwe 11-Sep-10
Wikileaks information on atrocities in Zimbabwe fields 
reported
10-Dec-10
Mathieu Lapfa unilaterally authorizes Zimbabwe exports 21-Mar-11
Global Witness pulls out of KPCS 05-Dec-11
Full Candidate Event List Continued
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Chapter III 
The Determinants of Sanction Threats and the Use of Coercive 
Economic Statecraft 
 
 
Despite being rare historically, economic sanctions are increasingly popular. The 
characteristics of sending and target countries that predict sanction events remain 
poorly understood however. In this paper, I investigate several determinants of the 
use of sanctions by one country against another, using a pair of datasets that, to my 
knowledge, have not previously been employed for these purposes. Using two 
variations of logistic regression models corrected for the study of rare events, I 
identify several significant issues that contribute to, or detract from, the likelihood 
that a country will use or threaten to use economic sanctions against another 
country in a given year. 
 
Specifically, I show that larger economies are substantially more likely to use 
sanctions than smaller economies. I also demonstrate that poorer countries are 
more often the targets of sanctions. Armed conflict in either a sending or a target 
country is predictive of sanction use, indicating that sanctions are often used to 
condemn conflict, compliment violent action, or influence the outcome of armed 
conflicts. Sanctions are more likely when a sending country’s exports are more 
highly concentrated in a smaller number of goods (measured using a Herfindahl-
Hirschmann index), while countries with a higher degree of international trade 
specialization in comparison to the global average (as measured by a Finger-Kreinin 
index) are less likely to be targeted with sanctions. 
 
I also investigate a number of relationships discussed elsewhere in the recent 
literature, and find limited support for a number of explanations for the frequency 
of sanction events. Democratic countries are less likely to use sanctions against one 
another in some versions of the analysis; however, the result depends on the 
definition of sanctions used, the time period under investigation, and the covariates 
included in the regression model. Unemployment rates also provide little 
explanatory power after controlling for GDP per capita, in addition to other 
indicators. 
 
JEL Classification: F51, Q34, Q37 
Keywords: Economic Sanctions, Rare Events, Conflict, Trade Sanctions, Economic 
Vulnerability  
 55 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Sanctions and coercive economic statecraft of various forms are increasingly common on the 
international stage. Examples of countries that restrict trade, access to finance and other 
economic activities in hopes of influencing the behavior of foreign states or foreign nationals 
have proliferated since the end of the Cold War, and more targeted and sophisticated measures 
have become routine in some countries. Recent high-profile examples such as UN-backed 
sanctions against Iran join hundreds of other cases, including activities to control drug 
trafficking and programs against terrorism and nuclear weapons proliferation. In the following 
sections, I analyze several concepts that the literature on economic sanctions suggests are 
predictive of the use of sanctions and other forms of coercive economic statecraft. 
There is no universally accepted definition of sanctions however, and throughout this study I 
use the term to refer to a broad group of actions that states take against one another. 
Specifically, I focus on actions taken by a “sender” state that limit economic linkages with a 
“target” state, which includes individuals living in the target state as well as companies that do 
business there. 
This paper contributes to the discussion of economic factors that characterize and predict a 
country initiating or threatening the use of sanctions against another country, using two 
datasets which, to my knowledge, have not previously appeared for these purposes in the 
literature. I estimate the likelihood of the use or threat of sanctions during a given year using 
several variations of a logistic regression model, and include explanatory variables associated 
with trade vulnerability, trade volume, demographic factors, macroeconomic indicators and 
violent events. 
I find that, despite fairly large differences in the composition of the two data sources, a 
number of characteristics of senders, targets, and the relationships between them are strongly 
predictive of sanction events. Several concepts relating to international trade, such the 
concentration and diversity of a country’s imports and exports are important determinants of 
sanction threats and use, in addition to macroeconomic indicators. Larger economies are 
substantially more likely to use sanctions, while poorer countries are more often targets and 
rarely initiate sanctions. The presence of an on-going armed conflict in the target country is 
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predictive as well, indicating that sanctions are often used to support outside state interests or 
to condemn the use of force. 
I also find an ambiguous relationship between democratic dyads and the use of sanctions, 
which is not fully consistent with the literature on this subject. Although it has been argued 
elsewhere that democratic countries less commonly use sanctions against one another, I show 
that for the data that I use, this result depends on the definition of sanctions being used, the 
period under investigation, and the covariates included in the regression model. 
In the following section, I discuss issues raised in both the qualitative and quantitative 
literature and list seven hypotheses, reflecting the consensus in the literature on the 
importance of a number of variables of interest. In Section 3.3, I describe the sources of the 
data I use, and in Section 3.4 I discuss the empirical approach. I report the results and discuss 
the implications of these findings in Section 3.5. I conclude in Section 3.6. 
 
3.2 Theory and Hypotheses 
The sanctions discussed in this paper are actions taken by states to affect the behavior of other 
states. This usually occurs when the authority issuing sanctions in the sending country contends 
that the target country has broken a rule, norm, or poses a threat to the sender’s interests.  
Interpreting the underlying motivations of sending countries is challenging however, and an 
extensive literature questions the extent to which public statements about the motivations for 
sanctions are credible. As Baldwin (1985) shows, states that engage in overt sanctions usually 
give justifications related to the actions of the target, but the secondary or tertiary purposes of 
sanctions can be related to many other considerations, and even the stated primary goal of the 
sender is often suspect.  
Baldwin provides an extensive list of examples where sanctions were undertaken to support 
the sender’s position with respect to other states that were not targeted, the reputation that 
the sender hoped to cultivate, and the interest groups that played important roles in decision 
making in the sending country. Because the motivations of states are not always clear, I limit 
the scope of this paper to describing attributes of states that make threats or the use of 
 57 
 
sanctions more likely, rather than focusing on the reasoning that states give for their actions, or 
the effectiveness of sanctions against specific types of targets. 
While noting the questionable credibility of public claims, for completeness I include general 
descriptions of the motivations of sending countries in Table 3.1 for one version of the data I 
use in Section 3.5. Among the most common stated reasons for using sanctions are trade and 
economic ties, security, and domestic issues in the sending country. 
Violations of trade rules are some of the most common transgressions cited by sending 
countries. Indeed, during the time period I investigate, responding to perceived trade abuses is 
the most common motivation, discussed 770 times (about 65% of the total for that version of 
the variable).32 Such criticisms are often related to what are described as “unfair” trading 
practices by the sending country, or manipulative monetary policies. Trade that relates to 
goods that are banned in the sending country, including drugs and other commonly regulated 
goods, also fall in this category. 
Issues relating to conflict and security are also common. In some cases, sending countries go 
so far as to call for regime change, using sanctions to support leadership transformation in a 
target state. Such actions are rare however. More common are sanctions designed to punish a 
country that has taken specific policy actions that are allegedly against the interests of the 
sending state. Examples include disputes over, and responses to, military aggression, weapons 
proliferation and the treatment of minority groups. Sending countries also often claim to be 
motivated by a desire to punish a target’s choice of allies. 
Although we can be relatively certain that sanctions are at times used for the purposes of 
affecting domestic markets or domestic political climates, examples of such are substantially 
more difficult to identify because they are seldom overtly discussed by the sender. Drury (2001) 
however, provides evidence of weak but important relationships with economic concerns in the 
sending country (the US in Drury (2001)), to which governments may respond by using 
sanctions against other countries. 
                                                          
32 For one version of the data I use on events. The Morgan, Bapat and Krustev (2012) data is one of two datasets 
used for the dependant variable in Section 3.5. The data are described at greater length in Section 3.3. The second 
version of the dependent variable, which is derived from a dataset created by King and Lowe (2012) does not 
include descriptions of the sender’s motivations. 
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Table 3.1 
 
 
3.2.1 Definitions and Classification 
There is ample debate over precise definitions of sanction events in both the economic and 
international relations literature, and because in this study I depart from the definitions used 
elsewhere, a brief discussion of the differences between the usage that I adopt here and those 
used elsewhere in the literature is in order.  
Examples of detailed sanction classifications include Kirshner (1997), who writes that 
definitions and systems of classification are pivotal questions when considering how sanctions 
are implemented, and to what effect. One reason that these issues are given such attention is 
that, given the focus in the literature on what attributes make for a “successful” sanction, 
lacking an understanding the objectives of the sender will lead to erroneous conclusions about 
the efficacy of the sender’s actions.  
Other scholars however refer to sanctions as only those activities taken or approved at the 
level of a recognized international body, such as the United Nations Security Council. This type 
of classification focuses more on the intended effects of the action, rather than the mechanism 
used to put the sending country’s policy into practice. In international law, multilaterally-
approved sanctions are a separate category from unilateral actions taken on the part of states 
Description Observations
Contain Political In‡fluence 10
Contain Military Behavior 15
Destabilize Regime 15
Release Citizens, Property, or Material 15
Solve Territorial Dispute 0
Deny Strategic Materials 0
Retaliate for Alliance or Alignment Choice 85
Improve Human Rights 45
End Weapons/Materials Proliferation 60
Terminate Support of Non-State Actors 20
Deter or Punish Drug Trafficking Practices 65
Improve Environmental Policies 70
Trade Practices 770
Implement Economic Reform 25
Total 1195
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without the support of an international body, and the latter are often referred to as "counter-
measures” or "retorsions", depending on the objective of the action.33  
Because the following analysis is not primarily concerned with the extent to which sanctions 
are successful however, I avoid the stricter definitions used elsewhere to reflect the way that 
the term “sanction” is popularly used to describe relationships between countries. The 
dependent variable I employ in Section 3.5 was generated electronically, using news articles 
that include terms like “sanction” or “embargo” to describe an event of international 
importance. The designation is substantially more expansive in comparison to other examples 
in the literature, which limits the comparability of the results discussed in Section 3.5 with 
investigations that use more conventional definitions. 
To avoid confusion, I limit the empirical investigation to categories that involve threats or 
actions made by states, and I exclude multilateral or non-state actors, as these groups discuss 
sanctions in ways that are considerably different from one another and from countries. Non-
governmental organizations also have much more variation in their credibility and undertake 
activities that are limited in scope in comparison to states.  
Events that I discuss in this paper are either actions reported by news services as the use of 
sanctions by a country against individuals, organizations or governments of another country, or 
are cases in which a country threatened to use such actions. This means that if multilateral 
action is taken, only countries that are discussed in the news media as implementing or 
supporting sanctions are included.  
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 provide general descriptions of events, displaying the number of actions 
by sending country in the two versions of the data used in this paper. Because sending events 
are so commonly initiated by the United States, I exclude that country from these figures, 
although the country is not excluded from the regression results. Figures 3.3 and 3.4 describe 
events by target country for the two datasets. 
                                                          
33 This is a matter of some dispute. Almost all countries (except the United States) commonly voice their 
displeasure with unilateral sanctions, and many avoid the term sanctions for official actions. The most public forum 
of this argument has been in UN General Assembly, where the United States has found itself in isolated opposition 
to measures to eliminate or moderate the use of unilateral sanctions (UN Resolutions R/52/181; R/53/10; 
R/54/200; R/56/179; R/57/5; R/62/162; R/64/170). Despite this distinction in legal and academic literature, 
practitioners including the US Treasury Department and the Treasury of the United Kingdom, as well as many other 
countries and organizations, use the term sanctions to refer to unilateral as well as multilateral actions. 
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Figure 3.1 
 
Figure 3.2 
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Figure 3.3 
 
Figure 3.4 
 
 
3.2.2 Explaining Sanction Use 
The dominant perspective in the literature on sanctions holds that the sender’s decision to take 
action is rational, and rooted in an analysis of the costs and benefits of taking action (Baldwin, 
1985) (Hufbauer, Schott, & Elliott, 1990). Such strategies would take into account the likelihood 
and value of success, as well as the damage that sanctions could inflict on the sender’s 
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economy. From the target’s point of view, the decision to capitulate is a function of the cost of 
giving in to the demands of the sender, compared to the value of resisting demands. The extent 
to which costs can be levied against a country is often described as the country’s “vulnerability” 
to sanctions. 
Although the relationship is usually conditional, several empirical studies have shown that 
economic coercion is both more likely and more successful when the costs to the sender are 
low and the costs to the target are high. Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott (1990); Lektzian and 
Souva (2007); Whang (2010) and Drezner (1999) for example, all consider the relative costs of 
sanctions to the sender and to the target as crucial factors in explaining the reasons that 
sanctions occur in some circumstances but not others, although such factors are not universally 
the most important ones in all of these analyses.  
According to this perspective, countries that are more dependent on trading partners, all 
other things being equal, are more vulnerable to the use of sanctions, while those that are 
more self-reliant are less vulnerable, and are thus more likely to be senders. Assuming they do 
not provoke other countries with their own sanction measures, less vulnerable countries are 
also thought to be less commonly targeted. States that are more able to withstand sanctions 
offer a lower probability of success from the point of view of the sender, and reduce the 
expected benefits of engaging in sanctions against the target.34 
Galtung (1967), also basing his claims on an analysis of costs and benefits for senders and 
targets, argues that a target’s vulnerability to trade sanctions is a central consideration for 
sender countries when they decide whether to use sanctions. Using Rhodesia as a case study, 
Galtung maintains that dependence on foreign countries for critical goods and services 
increases the effectiveness of sanctions against a target. To measure the extent of this 
vulnerability, Galtung proposes methods of examining foreign trade as a percent of GNP, export 
type concentration, and export partner concentration. Using these measures, Galtung argues 
that Rhodesia was particularly vulnerable when sanctions were first brought against that 
country, which in his opinion, helped to explain sanction use in that context. Other measures of 
                                                          
34 Economic interdependence need not take the form of trade specifically. The data used in this paper include 
examples of foreign economic aid reduction or state asset seizures as sanction events as well, provided that the 
event was described in the news media as such a coercive action. 
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opportunity costs include the subjective case study approach, and an indicator of the amount of 
trade between the sender and the target relative to each country’s GDP, used for example by 
Lektzian and Souva (2007). 
Sanctions may also be more effective against poor countries, as relative poverty may lower 
the cost for senders to obtain a given amount of economic hardship in the target country. 
Because poor countries usually have fewer resources available, in the event of sanctions, 
impoverished governments may be less able to offset the impact of sanctions on their 
populations. In cases where large shares of a target country’s population have a low standard of 
living, relatively small reductions in income or consumption can have serious implications on 
livelihoods, characterizing much higher costs to the target population due to sanctions than 
would be the case for similar measures taken against a country with a smaller share of people 
with a low standard of living. Petrescu (2007) shows that such costs can be severe. In the data 
used in that study, children who were exposed to sanction episodes in utero have lower birth 
weights, are more likely to die before their third birthday, and are shorter than children who 
were not exposed. These concerns may be especially crucial in countries that are more 
dependent on economic aid, or are less able to provide for basic needs in times of crisis.  
The cost and benefits for interest groups within both the target and sending countries have 
also been shown to increase or decrease the likelihood of sanction events. The Kaempfer and 
Lowenberg (1992) model embraces this point of view, and assumes that the size and 
composition of domestic lobbying groups determines the existence and severity of sanctions 
employed by sender countries.  
Sanctions against a large oil producer are an example of this relationship. In the event of 
heavy restrictions placed on such a country, alternative sources of oil, perhaps even producers 
in the sanction-sending country, benefit from a reduction in competition and a higher price 
than that which would have otherwise prevailed on the global market. If oil producers were 
alone in voicing their interests, it could be expected that sanctions on the oil industry against 
the target country would be more likely. But there are rarely circumstances in which debate is 
so one-sided; oil consumers have just as much incentive to oppose sanctions, particularly if the 
higher cost of oil is passed on to them. The Kaempfer and Lowenberg model would suggest in 
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this scenario that the decision to use or refrain from using sanctions against the target oil 
producing country depends on the importance of the issue for the consumer interest group, 
and the importance of the issue for un-sanctioned producers, as well as the size of each group, 
and their willingness to pay to either have sanctions or to avoid them. 
Drury (2001) considers the importance of interest groups and elite opinion by studying the 
effect of presidential popularity, election timing, the US dollar inflation rate, and 
unemployment on the President of the United States’ decision to initiate or refrain from using 
sanctions on targeted countries. The author shows that although the US election cycle does not 
predict the decision to initiate sanctions, presidential popularity is marginally important. The 
author also shows that higher levels of unemployment increase the likelihood of sanction 
events in the United States, providing evidence that domestic conditions are indeed significant 
factors in some contexts because sanction use may be related to either undermining 
international competition (benefiting local producers and perhaps lowering the unemployment 
rate) and as a means to distract attention from domestic problems. 
Another possible predictor of sanction events comes from Cox and Drury (2006), which, in an 
extension of the theory of “democratic peace”, argues that democratic regimes are less likely to 
sanction one another, perhaps due to a lack of popular support within democracies for actions 
against other democracies. 
 
3.2.3 Sanctions and Trade 
When most people think of sanctions or embargoes, they think of trade. This is due in large part 
to the high visibility of modern sanction programs against states like Iran and North Korea, but 
is also grounded in the historical definition of sanctions, including the classic example of the 
Megarian decree, recounted by the Greek historian Thucydides. The prominence of trade-
related actions is also related to the relative ease of implementing trade sanctions in 
comparison to more technically complex options, like financial sanctions and other similar 
measures. 
The potential importance of trade relationships with respect to decisions about the use of 
sanctions is ambiguous however. From one point of view, it is clearly the case that high levels of 
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trade give states leverage to extract concessions or to punish what the sending country 
perceives as transgressions. Countries that trade more have more to lose and the targets of 
threats may be more willing to comply with a trading partner’s demands when sending 
countries can more credibly threaten economic harm. 
Yet high levels of trade also provide incentives to refrain from issuing sanctions, because, in 
all likelihood, senders receive some benefits from trading relationships as well. Although by no 
means universally true, severing trade ties usually bears costs for both senders and targets. 
Assuming that countries act rationally with respect to sanctioning decisions would suggest that 
senders compare such costs to the importance of the objective(s) they hope to achieve, 
eventually arriving at a decision about the wisdom of using sanctions. 
The concept of vulnerability, discussed earlier as the extent to which a country can 
withstand the costs of sanctions used by a given country, is central to trade explanations of 
sanctions and similar actions. Scholars of sanctions have often argued that high degrees of 
specialization in exports, defined as goods and services that are less commonly traded 
internationally in comparison to all other countries, allow countries leverage to initiate 
sanctions (Askari, Forrer, Yang, & Hachem, 2005) (Crawford, 1993) (Porter, 1979). The logical 
extension of this idea is that although greater power on the part of buyers can generate 
leverage against a target, it can also be a threat to a country with fewer, more highly specialized 
imported goods and few alternative export sources. Countries with greater specialization in 
their exports are more vulnerable targets, but also have more leverage over importers if they 
are one of few exporters. In the empirical section of this paper, I use import and export 
diversity to consider the importance of the direction of trade flows, as well as measures of 
bilateral trade between senders and targets. 
I measure the difference between global average trade and that of the target and sending 
country using a Finger-Kreinin index. The motivation for using this measure is that countries 
with more specialized exports in comparison to the rest of the world may have more leverage 
over importers, because importers have few alternative countries from which to choose. 
Alternatively, relying heavily on exports of goods that are less commonly exported by other 
countries can expose the exporter to the risk of import restrictions implemented by a sending 
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country on its own economy. If there are few alternative importers of the good, the importer 
has greater leverage over the exporter. 
A similar but not identical relationship is import and export concentration, which I measure 
using a Herfindahl-Hirschmann index. Countries that import a small basket of goods that are 
widely available on the international market are often thought to be less vulnerable to 
sanctions, while exporters that have relatively few types of exports are thought to be more 
vulnerable.  
 
3.2.4 Sanctions and Security 
As early as the aftermath of World War I, supporters of the League of Nations proposed that 
sanctions developed by the body could be a non-violent alternative to armed confrontation. 
Although more recent research has shown that the health effects and the impact on livelihoods 
of sanctions can be severe (Petrescu, 2007) (Barry, 2000), sanctions provide a substitute or 
companion approach to engaging in violent conflict that does not require putting the sending 
country’s military at risk, among other considerations. As I will demonstrate in the following 
sections, states often initiate and threaten sanctions to achieve military and strategic goals in 
on-going conflict situations, either instead of or alongside the use of violent force on the part of 
the sending country. In the midst of violent conflict states often also support restrictions, for 
example, to diminish the capacity for fighting in general.  
An increasingly popular motivation for using sanctions in conflict situations has been to 
contain violent groups that the sender hopes to disadvantage relative to the opponents of the 
target. Such actions often encourage the target to engage in sanctions as well, as a form of 
reciprocation, or may encourage allies to strengthen trade ties with the target, and draw back 
from trade relationships with the sender. 
Another common motivation for using sanctions relating to security is to undermine the 
capabilities of groups or states defined by the sender as hostile. At present, the United States is 
the most frequent sanction sender by a large margin. Most of these cases, including restrictions 
on Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Somalia and Libya, were and continue to be justified as attempts to 
undermine the capabilities of hostile parties in other states. Other common initiators include 
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the United Kingdom alongside fellow members of the European Union, as well as large 
economic powers such as Russia and China.  
 
3.2.5 Hypotheses 
The characteristics of senders, targets and inter-state relationships that make the use of 
sanctions more likely are diverse. In the following sections, I deal primarily with the following 
hypotheses as discussed in this section and distilled from the recent literature on the subject of 
sanctions: 
 
  : Larger economies are more often senders 
 
  :  Poorer economies are more often targets 
 
  : Countries with a higher value on the import and export Finger-Kreinin index are 
more likely to be senders and targets. 
 
  : Countries with high export and import concentration are more likely to be 
senders. 
 
  : Countries with higher unemployment rates are more likely to initiate sanctions 
than countries with lower unemployment rates. 
 
  : Pairs of democratic countries should sanction one another less often than if one 
of the countries in the pair is not ruled by a democratic regime. 
 
  : Countries engaged in violent conflict are more often targets and senders. 
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3.3 Data Description 
I use two datasets to construct separate versions of a binary dependent variable describing the 
use or threat of sanctions. In both cases, an observation includes a target country, a sending 
country and the year. All countries with populations of more than 1 million people are included 
for all years covered in the analysis; including countries that have never or have not recently 
experienced sanctions.  
The first version of the dependent variable I use in the following sections was created by 
Morgan, Bapat and Krustev (2012). The development of the Morgan, Bapat and Krustev dataset 
proceeded in two stages; a first “candidate” list was created primarily from Lexis-Nexis, Facts on 
File, and Keesing’s Record of Contemporary Events, searching for terms such as “sanction”, 
“embargo”, “trade war”, “blockade”, and “foreign aid reduction”, among others. The list was 
then supplemented by searches in both the New York Times and London Times indexes. 
The data were then amended by a human coder to fit the definition set out by the authors; 
namely, that the events involve at least one sender state and a target state, and that actions 
were implemented or threatened by the sender in order to change the behavior of the target 
state. The dataset does not include events which were undertaken for purely domestic reasons, 
such as to benefit domestic producers. In the analysis below I restrict the dates for this dataset 
to 1995-2000 due to data availability considerations for the explanatory variables of interest. 
The resulting data include 258 events of sanctions use or threats, many of which count in 
multiple categories  (Morgan, Krustev, & Bapat, 2012). 
An alternate version of the data with similar characteristics can be extracted from a dataset 
generated by King and Lowe (2012), which I use as a separate version of the dependent variable 
in the regression models outlined below. The data were derived from a content analysis of 
Reuters reports and list all uses of the terms “sanctions”, “embargoes”, and related concepts 
(such as “withdrawal of economic aid”). Like the Morgan, Bapat and Krustev dataset, the King 
and Lowe data are not solely measures of the use of sanctions or embargoes, but include the 
discussion of possible economic coercion, or the use of threats of sanctions in the relationships 
between sender and target countries.35 
                                                          
35 For a full list of countries included in these data please see Appendix A 
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The King and Lowe dataset covers the period between 1995 and 2004. I extract sanction 
event information according to the classifications provided in table 3.2.36  
Table 3.2 
 
For both datasets, a non-event indicates that at no point in a given year was it reported in 
the news services used that the sending country threatened or initiated a sanction against the 
target country. If multiple events are recorded over a given year, only a single observation 
appears in the data I use, per year. Each year is considered independently, so a previous 
sanction does not preclude an analysis of additional sanctions in later years. Including all 
country dyads, there are 211,424 country pairs for the Morgan, Bapat and Krustev data and 
357,796 for the King and Lowe data. 
The two datasets are dissimilar in several respects. The Morgan, Bapat and Krustev data 
include more trade-related sanctions, and human coders excluded cases when a sanction was 
being undertaken for the benefit of domestic industries or for domestic concerns, according to 
the interpretation of the coder. The King and Lowe data do not remove sanctions undertaken 
for the benefit of domestic industries, and trade-related issues were treated as a separate 
category in the King and Lowe data. The difference between the sources may also be an 
important consideration, as the news services used by the two sources did not overlap. Over 
the time period covered in the Morgan, Bapat and Krustev data, approximately 10% of sanction 
                                                          
36 The Morgan, Bapat and Krustev data unfortunately do not allow disaggregation at the sanction type level. 
Code Description Obs
TSAN Threats of non-military, non-physical force social, economic and 33
TRSA Threaten to reduce or stop the giving of aid. 3
TBOE Threaten to boycott or impose embargoes, restrict normal 4
TRBR Threaten to reduce or formally sever ties. 7
SANC All sanctions not otherwise specified. 441
REDA Reductions or terminations of aid not otherwise specified. 108
HECO Decrease or terminate provision of economic aid. 7
HAID Decrease or terminate provision of humanitarian aid. 50
HMIL Decrease or terminate provision of military aid. 6
SEZR Take control of positions or possessions. 145
SEIZ All seizures not otherwise specified. 16
Total 820
Cases of "Threats or Use of Economic Statecraft"  --  1995-2004
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events appear in both datasets, and 25% of the country pairs are the same (though with 
different years). 
As discussed previously, trade is the most common consideration in analyses of the 
opportunity costs of sanctions. I use three types of explanatory variables related to aspects of 
trade for senders and targets. The first type is a Herfindahl-Hirschmann (HH) index of import 
and export concentration (where a value closer to 1 signifies greater concentration) which I use 
to test   in the empirical section: 
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Where    is the country index,   is the number of products at the SITC 3-digit group level,    is 
the value of exports for product    and: 
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The second type is a Finger-Kreinin (FK) measure of the difference of the country’s exports 
from the global average, an index value closer to 1 signifies greater difference from the world 
average for that product: 
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Where     is the share of product   in total exports or imports of country   and,    is the 
share of product   in total world exports or imports.  
I use the FK index to test    in the empirical section. Both this and the HH index come from 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2012). I also use the value of trade 
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(excluding services) between country pairs in millions of USD from Barbieri and Keshk (2012), 
which is distributed as a compliment to Correlates of War Project’s datasets. 
To investigate the importance of violent events and the use of sanctions, I use the PIRO 
Conflict Events Dataset  (Gleditsch, et al., 2012), which includes 52,246 country pairings with a 
conflict in the target country for the years of interest in the King and Lowe dataset, and 32,769 
for the Morgan, Bapat and Krustev dataset. 
Although Drury (2001) finds that unemployment rates are significant only in specific 
circumstances in cases of US sanctions, I include unemployment rates reported by the 
International Labour Organization (2012) to consider this relationship for all countries in the 
combined dataset used to obtain the results in Section 3.5. I use this measure to test  .  
Drury and Cox (2006) also find that although democracies sanction far more often than non-
democracies, there are few cases of democracies using sanctions against one another. Because 
this relationship has not, to my knowledge, been analyzed using versions of the dependent 
variable that include threats as well as events, I include a similar measure of democracy using 
the Polity IV dataset (Marshall, Jaggers, & Gurr, 2012). To investigate  , I construct a binary 
variable which takes a value of 1 when both the sender and the target are democracies, which I 
define as a polity score of greater than or equal to 6. To investigate   and    I use total GDP 
and per capita GDP from the Penn World Tables (2012). 
The distance between countries has been shown to be significant in some analyses, and I use 
distance between capitals from Gleditsch (2012) as a control. 
 
3.4 Empirical Approach 
3.4.1 Corrected Logistic Regression and Complimentary Log-Log Regression 
In the following analysis,37 I estimate the probability of “the use or threat of sanctions”      
      , a binary outcome that follows a Bernoulli probability function taking a value of 1 with 
probability    and 0 with probability 1-  . The probability    varies over   as an inverse logistic 
function of a vector    that includes a constant term and     explanatory variables: 
 
                                                          
37 The notation and explanation of the empirical strategy given here closely follows King and Zeng (2001) 
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The regression model is estimated using log-likelihood, which simplifies to: 
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The estimation procedure finds the value of   that gives the maximum value of    .  
The use of sanctions by one country against another is very rare, which complicates the 
empirical strategy. Very small values of    pose challenges for estimating what would be, in a 
balanced outcome context, a simple logistic regression problem. 
The difficulty arises because, with a larger number of non-cases, the variance for positive 
cases will be smaller than for non-cases, as is demonstrated using Monte Carlo simulations in 
King and Zeng (2001). Additional positive event observations are therefore more informative 
than non-cases  (Imbens, 1992). I use the procedure outlined by King and Zeng (2001) to correct 
for the underestimation of the coefficients.  
As a robustness check, I run the same regressions using complimentary log-log regression, 
and report the results alongside the corrected logistic regressions below. The methodology is 
identical in most respects, and although the difference in results from a common logistic 
approach and a corrected logistic approach are in this case quite small, the corrected (or clog-
log) approach is more accurate. 
 
3.4.2 Rare Events and Relative Risk 
In addition to the regression coefficients, I include information in the discussion section of this 
study concerning the absolute and relative risk of the use or threatened use of sanctions given 
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the explanatory variables, which is more often reported in studies of rare events and is more 
readily interpretable. 
Absolute risk in this context is defined as the probability that an event occurs given certain 
values of the explanatory variables included in the regression model: 
 
                                                                                                              
 
Relative risk is used to investigate the change in the probability of an event given some 
change in an explanatory variable, holding other variables at some specified level (which I 
always set at the mean values of all other variables in the analysis below). The measure 
similarly estimates the probability that an event occurs, but reports the fractional increase in 
risk rather than the direct probability of the event occurring, for example: 
 
           
           38
                                                                                                
 
3.4.3  Temporal relation 
An additional issue is that time-series cross-section data, when used to analyze a binary 
dependent variable, commonly violates the independence assumption of the ordinary logistic 
statistical model. Because outcomes can be temporally related, this may lead to misleading 
results if the baseline hazard function is not properly accounted for.  
Temporal relation is a concern in the context of this paper, as it is reasonable to assume that 
the threat or use of sanctions between two countries depends to some extent on whether the 
two countries have a history of using sanctions against one another. Such a relationship leads 
to standard errors which systematically underestimate variability, invalidating a regression 
model that does not include dummy variables associated with the time passed since the last 
realization of an event (   ). 
                                                          
38 The weights, absolute risk, and relative risk estimates of the use of sanctions I report below were generated 
according to the recommendations of King and Zeng (2001) in the Stata package accompanying that paper. 
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Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998) provide such a method using splines, which I include in the 
regression models discussed in Section 3.5.39  
 
3.5 Results and Discussion 
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 display regression coefficients for models that include levels of variables 
including trade, and indexes of trade concentration and diversity, while Tables 3.5 and 3.6 
report a sensitivity analysis, moving from the 10th percentile of the variable to the 90th, while 
holding all variables other than that which under study at their mean values. 
As expected, not all of the concepts I explore are statistically significant in both the Morgan, 
Bapat and Krustev and the King and Lowe datasets. This is due to the two data sources covering 
different time periods, and that the two use different source materials, in addition to 
differences in coding strategies discussed in Section 3.3. Finding that a relationship is strong in 
both datasets and across both regression types gives greater credibility to those findings for 
which they are present, but finding no relationship in one dataset while finding a statistically 
significant one in the other has ambiguous implications. 
In most respects, the results I report above confirm the hypotheses discussed in Section 3.2 
of this study, although there are several exceptions which I discuss at greater length below. In 
addition to the hypotheses however, there are several notable relationships arising in the 
results that deserve mention. 
The results show that the most important determinates for use or threats of sanctions by 
states are the size of the target and sender economies, the per capita GDP of the target 
country, on-going armed conflict in the target country, and variables which measure import and 
export diversity and concentration.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
39 For the results reported below, I include cubic splines generated via the “btscs” Stata command accompanying 
that paper. 
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Table 3.3 
 
Corr-Logit C-loglog
Distance between Capital Cities (km) -0.044 -0.036
                (0.107) (0.102)
Joint Democracy  -0.409 -0.341
                (0.314) (0.317)
Value of Sndr's Imports from Trgt/ Sndr's Total Imports -0.063 -0.07
                (0.062) (0.063)
Value of Trgt's Imports from Sndr/ Trgt's Total Imports 0.320*** 0.325***
                (0.088) (0.085)
Sender's Import Concentration 0.301 0.201
                (0.222) (0.209)
Senders Import Diversity -0.524 0.117
                (0.635) (0.62)
Sender's Export Concentration 1.116*** 0.969** 
                (0.336) (0.324)
Senders Export Diversity -1.399 -1.742*  
                (0.84) (0.815)
Target's Import Diversity 1.083** 0.990** 
                (0.396) (0.371)
Target's Export Diversity -1.760*** -1.585***
                (0.428) (0.403)
Sender Unemployment 0.183 0.326
                (0.218) (0.21)
Armed Conflict Involving Sender Country 0.801** 0.779** 
                (0.31) (0.3)
Armed Conflict Involving Target Country 0.242 0.227
                (0.179) (0.169)
Sender Total GDP 0.962*** 0.909***
                (0.111) (0.108)
Target Total GDP 0.543*** 0.522***
                (0.087) (0.087)
Target Per-Capita GDP -0.244** -0.202*  
                (0.092) (0.087)
Sender Per-Capita GDP -0.04 -0.009
                (0.174) (0.171)
Time since Last Event -1.252*** -1.132***
                (0.328) (0.311)
Spline 1 -0.322 -0.278
                (0.339) (0.324)
Spline 2 0.161 0.14
                (0.294) (0.282)
Spline 3 -0.036 -0.041
                (0.174) (0.169)
Constant        -18.586*** -18.781***
                -3.114 -3.034
log_likelihood                 -889.866
LR_chi_square                  1140.999
Continuous Variables Logged
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                Morgan, Krustev & Bapat (1995-2000)
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Table 3.4 
 
Corr-Logit C-loglog
Distance between Capital Cities (km) -0.259*  -0.226*  
                (0.11) (0.108)
Joint Democracy  -0.101 -0.056
                (0.251) (0.245)
Value of Sndr's Imports from Trgt/ Sndr's Total Imports 0.067 0.06
                (0.072) (0.072)
Value of Trgt's Imports from Sndr/ Trgt's Total Imports 0.036 0.05
(0.082) (0.08)
Sender's Import Concentration 0.43 0.351
                (0.278) (0.272)
Senders Import Diversity -1.460*  -1.256*  
                (0.606) (0.577)
Sender's Export Concentration 0.778** 0.775** 
                (0.251) (0.244)
Senders Export Diversity 0.38 0.273
                (0.66) (0.65)
Target's Import Diversity 0.409 0.315
                (0.42) (0.408)
Target's Export Diversity -1.140** -1.025** 
                (0.39) (0.381)
Sender Unemployment -0.298 -0.247
                (0.171) (0.165)
Armed Conflict Involving Sender Country 0.591*** 0.452** 
                (0.174) (0.168)
Armed Conflict Involving Target Country 0.637***  0.578***
                (0.152) (0.146)
Sender Total GDP 0.917*** 0.884***
                (0.111) (0.109)
Target Total GDP 0.496*** 0.473***
                (0.099) (0.097)
Target Per-Capita GDP -0.386*** -0.352***
                (0.101) (0.099)
Sender Per-Capita GDP 0.184 0.149
                (0.129) (0.125)
Time since Last Event -0.914*** -0.840***
                (0.145) (0.138)
Spline 1 -0.107** -0.096*  
                (0.04) (0.038)
Spline 2 0.083 0.075
                (0.044) (0.042)
Spline 3 -0.038 -0.034
                (0.032) (0.031)
Constant        -16.759*** -16.495***
                (2.621) (2.565)
log_likelihood                 -1315.722
LR_chi_square                  1528.02
Continuous Variables Logged
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                King and Lowe (1995-2004)
 77 
 
Table 3.5 
 
Table 3.6 
 
 
Variable RR
Distance between Capital Cities (km) 0.561 0.347 - 0.913
Sndr's Imports from Trgt/ Sndr's Total Imports 1.740 0.556 - 5.520
Trgt's Imports from Sndr/ Trgt's Total Imports 1.299 0.416 - 3.941
Sender's Import Concentration 1.557 0.859 - 2.617
Senders Import Diversity 0.294 0.102 - 0.806
Sender's Export Concentration 3.256 1.533 - 6.643
Senders Export Diversity 1.361 0.474 - 4.147
Target's Import Diversity 1.464 0.682 - 2.964
Target's Export Diversity 0.410 0.219 - 0.748
Sender Unemployment 0.630 0.366 - 1.056
Armed Conflict Involving Sender Country 1.823 1.333 - 2.502
Armed Conflict Involving Target Country 1.887 1.355 - 2.529
Sender Total GDP 49.587 18.874 - 121.151
Target Total GDP 11.473 4.355 - 29.269
Sender Per-Capita GDP 1.640 0.840 - 3.093
Target Per-Capita GDP 0.249 0.118 - 0.504
King and Lowe Relative Risk from 10th Perc. to 90th Perc.
95% Conf. Int.
Variable RR
Distance between Capital Cities (km) 0.902 0.573 - 1.456
Sndr's Imports from Trgt/ Sndr's Total Imports 0.593 0.234 - 1.652
Trgt's Imports from Sndr/ Trgt's Total Imports 8.207 2.639 - 23.957
Sender's Import Concentration 1.337 0.881 - 2.077
Senders Import Diversity 0.633 0.218 - 1.745
Sender's Export Concentration 5.747 1.922 - 15.838
Senders Export Diversity 0.327 0.081 - 1.314
Target's Import Diversity 2.596 1.321 - 5.305
Target's Export Diversity 0.253 0.135 - 0.472
Sender Unemployment 1.301 0.684 - 2.624
Armed Conflict Involving Sender Country 2.246 1.255 - 4.214
Armed Conflict Involving Target Country 1.271 0.898 - 1.779
Sender Total GDP 58.01 21.956 - 145.429
Target Total GDP 14.992 6.443 - 34.904
Sender Per-Capita GDP 0.890 0.378 - 2.158
Target Per-Capita GDP 0.415 0.222 - 0.794
  Morgan, Krustev & Bapat Relative Risk from 10th Perc. to 90th Perc.
95% Conf. Int.
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Kilometer distance between a pair of countries’ capitals is also significant, but only in the 
King and Lowe data. In this version of the analysis, distance is negatively associated with the 
use of sanctions and is statistically significant at the 1% level, signifying that countries that are 
farther from one another are less likely to use sanctions. Holding all other variables at their 
mean levels, a change in logged distance from the 90th percentile to the 10th percentile doubles 
the likelihood of a sanction-related event.  
The value of goods traded between two countries is a significant predictor of sanction 
events, depending on the data used and the definition of the value of trade employed in the 
regression. Although the value of imports the sender receives (divided by the value of total 
imports in the sending country) is not statistically significant in any specification, a measure of 
the value of the target’s imports from the sender (divided by the value of the target’s total 
imports) is statistically significant and positive in the Morgan, Bapat and Krustev dataset. The 
result is consistent using both corrected logistic regression and complementary log-log 
regression. This result signifies that in some cases, sending countries are more likely to initiate 
sanctions when the sender’s exports to the country make up a larger percentage of the target’s 
total imports. Alternative specifications using the value of trade (rather than the value as a 
percentage of total trade for either the sender or target) show no statistically significant 
relationship after controlling for the other variables discussed in the analysis.  
It is not clear why the value of trade is not a more important consideration in the decision of 
whether to engage in sanctions. One possibility is that the presence of a large amount of trade 
between two countries has an ambiguous effect on the decision to engage in sanctions, 
because sanctioning a trading partner can be both more costly to the sender, even as it can be 
more damaging to the target. 
The relationship is broadly consistent with the point of view that vulnerability to sanctions is 
an important determinant of sanction events, but it is not clear why the link is only evident in 
the Morgan, Bapat and Krustev data and not also in the King and Lowe version of the 
dependent variable. It is unlikely that the discrepancy is due to the difference in time periods, 
as limiting the coverage in the King and Lowe dataset to match that of the Morgan, Bapat and 
Krustev dataset does not result in a significant coefficient for regression models using the 
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former. The discrepancy may arise due to dissimilar definitions of sanction events, or, despite a 
coefficient that is significant at the 0.1% level, a spurious result for the Morgan, Bapat and 
Krustev data. 
 
  : Larger economies are more often senders 
In all versions of the analysis, the size of both the sender and target economies is statistically 
significant with a positive coefficient, indicating that larger economies are more often both 
senders and targets. This finding corroborates the literature on the subject summarized by  , 
which suggests that larger economies use their clout to threaten and invoke sanctions more 
often on the international stage than is the case for smaller economies. In the King and Lowe 
data, a sending country in the 90th percentile of logged total GDP is almost 50 times more likely 
to initiate sanctions than a country in the 10th percentile. In the Morgan, Bapat and Krustev 
data, a country in the 90th percentile is 58 times more likely to initiate sanctions than a country 
in the 10th percentile. 
In most cases, larger economies have broader and more varied geopolitical interests than do 
smaller economies, motivating more active economic and foreign policy. This would suggest 
that sanctions often occur when large economies use economic means to pursue political or 
relational objectives with the international community, and that smaller economies either do 
not engage in such activities, or that they more often use other means to do so. 
There are several additional reasons that larger economies may be more often sanction 
targets and recipients, even after controlling for per capita GDP, trade relationships, and the 
other factors I discuss below. Larger economies are often more resistant to being sanctioned in 
retaliation, as they are usually more able to offset the effects of trade sanctions with local 
production. Retaliation in the form of aid reduction or asset seizures is also usually a smaller 
percentage of total economic activity for larger economies than for smaller ones. 
 
  :  Poorer economies are more often targets 
For all versions of the regression models used in this analysis, countries that are poorer on a per 
capita basis are more likely to be targets than more wealthy countries. This result suggests that 
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large economies are more likely to use sanctions in general, but are also more likely to use 
sanctions against countries in which the sanctions have the greatest effect. In the Morgan, 
Bapat and Krustev data, a country in the 10th percentile of per captia GDP is almost 2.3 times 
more likely to be a target than a country in the 90th percentile. In the King and Lowe data, a 
poorer country is 4.4 times more likely to be a target. 
This result supports the “vulnerability” point of view in the literature, and may indicate that 
countries more often use sanctions against targets that are less resistant to the effects of 
sanctions. Poorer countries are likely to suffer more under sanctions that richer ones, meaning 
that generating a given amount of harm might be less costly for sending countries when they 
target poor countries than when they target wealthier ones. 
 
  : Countries with a higher value on the import and export Finger-Kreinin index are 
more likely to be senders and targets. 
This study provides weak but statistically significant evidence in support of  . The results show 
that the coefficient for the target import diversity index is positive and significant at the 1% 
level for the Morgan, Bapat and Krustev dataset. This signifies that a higher value for the 
target’s diversity index (or a “greater difference from the global average”) predicts a greater 
likelihood of a sanction event.40 
In the Morgan, Bapat and Krustev dataset, a country in the 90th percentile is 2.5 times more 
likely to be a target than a country in the 10th percentile, which is consistent with  . This 
suggests that countries that are more dependent on specific imports that are less commonly 
imported in other countries are more often targeted by sending countries. 
The strongest relationship among the Finger-Kreinin indexes is the target’s export diversity. 
The coefficient is negative and significant at the 1% or 0.1% level for both versions of the 
dependent variable and for both regression model types. In the King and Lowe data, a country 
                                                          
40 The coefficient in the King and Lowe dataset is not significant statistically significant in the specifications listed 
here. Further analysis (available on request) shows that although similar results to the Morgan, Bapat and Krustev 
data are obtained in regressions that exclude per capita GDP, controlling for relative wealth diminishes the 
statistical significance of target import specialization for both data sources. 
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in the 10th percentile of the Finger-Kreinin index for export diversity is 2.4 times more likely to 
be the target of sanctions than a country in the 90th percentile. 
Countries are also slightly less likely to initiate or threaten sanctions if their imported goods 
are more specialized, which supports the view that vulnerability to trade sanctions influences 
the decisions of states to initiate or threaten sanctions. In the King and Lowe data, a country in 
the 10th percentile in the logged import diversity index is 6.3 times more likely to initiate or 
threaten sanctions than a country in the 90th percentile.41 
 
  : Countries with high export and import concentration are more likely to be 
senders. 
The sender export concentration index is significant at the 0.1% level with a positive coefficient 
for the King and Lowe data, which means that sanctions are more likely when sending countries 
have a more specific group of goods that they trade. A country in that dataset is 3.2 times more 
likely to initiate or threaten sanctions if they are in the 90th percentile than if they are in the 
10th percentile of the logged export concentration index. In the Morgan, Bapat and Krustev 
data, a country in the 90th percentile is 5.7 times more likely to threaten or initiate sanctions 
than a country in the 10th percentile. 
Countries that export a smaller number of goods are more likely to use sanctions than 
countries with a broad basket of export goods. This may indicate that countries that export a 
small number of goods are more likely to use their market power in the specialties to extract 
foreign policy concessions. 
 
  : Countries with higher unemployment rates are more likely to initiate sanctions 
than countries with lower unemployment rates. 
The research motivating    suggests that higher unemployment rates in the United States 
increase the probability the US will use or threaten sanctions. This result does not appear to 
hold for all countries in this analysis however. This may be due to several differences between 
                                                          
41 The relationship is also apparent to a limited extent in the Morgan, Bapat and Krustev data, although the 
coefficient is not statistically significant. A country in the 10th percentile for in the logged import diversity index in 
that dataset is 1.9 times more likely to initiate or threaten sanctions than a country in the 90th percentile. 
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the approach used here and that used in Drury (2001), including the addition of sanction 
threats as well as the use of sanctions, analysis of other countries, and dissimilar time periods in 
the analysis. 
The result does not lend greater credibility to the argument that domestic political factors 
are as large a concern as has been speculated, however, it is difficult to interpret a non-result in 
this context. Although unemployment rates may indeed be important in certain circumstances, 
domestic policies with respect to unemployment likely generate substantial heterogeneity 
among policy prescriptions in different countries. 
 
  : Pairs of democratic countries should sanction one another less often than if one 
of the countries in the pair is not ruled by a democratic regime. 
In the data I use, there does not appear to be a systematic relationship between sanction 
events and democratic dyads. This in itself is somewhat surprising, as a strong 
“democratic peace” result has been reported elsewhere in the literature. 
The Morgan, Bapat and Krustev data in a negative coefficient significant at the 5% to 
1% level if the analysis is undertaken using the value of trade between two countries, 
rather than the percentage of total trade a partner represents. The statistical significance 
disappears in an analysis that includes both per capita GDP and bilateral trade as a 
percentage of total trade. 
These conflicting descriptions may indicate that evidence reported in the literature 
which supports the “democratic peace” interpretation with respect to sanctions hinges on 
the time period under consideration, the definition of sanction events, or the covariates 
included in the regression model. That the result is so sensitive in this analysis makes it 
difficult to interpret with any certainty. 
 
  : Countries engaged in violent conflict are more often targets and senders. 
Armed conflict is positively associated with the use of sanctions in both versions of the 
dependent variable. A dummy variable signifying that a sending country is engaged in armed 
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conflict is positive and statistically significant at the 1% to 0.1% level in both the Morgan, Bapat 
and Krustev data and the King and Lowe data. 
Armed Conflict in a target country is also positively correlated with sanction onset in the King 
and Lowe data. This is not the case for Morgan, Bapat and Krustev data however, which 
excludes several wars that began after 2001, and falls somewhat short of statistical significance. 
The fact that the result is sensitive to the time period under study likely indicates that it is 
driven by a small number of examples. The United States is a far more active sender than any 
other single country (and is also a popular target), which means that the inclusion of that 
country specifically is a significant issue in the analysis. 
A finding confirming that countries, and particularly the United States, often get involved in 
conflict situations through sanctions is not surprising. Particularly in cases where the outcome 
of conflict in a target has direct implications for the sending country, one would expect 
countries to take sides and support groups or parties that share their interests. The countries in 
conflict that drew events during periods of conflict are shown in Figure 3.5. Over the longer 
time period in the King and Lowe data as well, the relationship remains robust, as can be seen 
in Figure 3.6. 
Figure 3.5 
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Figure 3.6 
 
For several reasons, the versions of the regression model used in this paper likely 
underestimate the occurrence of sanctions used in the midst of conflict. One recent example of 
such a situation comes from Côte d'Ivoire, which suffered an extended period of conflict in the 
aftermath of elections in late 2010. Alassane Ouattara, the winner of the presidential election 
according to international observers, ordered a complete halt to trade of cocoa to undermine 
the position of Laurent Gbagbo, the former President who claimed that the election results 
were fraudulent. Such untargeted export bans are excluded from the type of analysis I use in 
this paper because they are not directed at an individual state. 
Another issue is that during a conflict, states may support one side or another yet wish to do 
so clandestinely. Selectively imposing import bans on participants in a conflict in other contexts 
would be included in this paper as a sanction, yet due to the secretive nature of many such 
programs, they would not commonly be reported by news services and would therefore be 
excluded from an this analysis. These are only a few examples of ways in which embargoes and 
sanctions in conflict circumstances could fall outside of the definitions used in this paper. 
 
 
 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
U
SA
In
d
ia
R
u
ss
ia
Ir
aq
P
ak
is
ta
n
Is
ra
e
l
M
ya
n
m
ar
C
o
lo
m
b
ia
Su
d
an
C
am
b
o
d
ia
Th
ai
la
n
d
Tu
rk
e
y
U
n
it
ed
 K
in
gd
o
m
A
fg
h
an
is
ta
n
B
u
ru
n
d
i
Eg
yp
t
Et
h
io
p
ia
Li
b
e
ri
a
A
n
go
la
D
em
o
cr
at
ic
…
Iv
o
ry
 C
o
as
t
Sr
i L
an
ka
U
zb
e
ki
st
an
Events Against Targets During Conflict 
Years in King & Lowe Data 
 85 
 
3.6  Conclusion 
Sanction use is on the rise throughout the world, yet the determinants and characteristics that 
predict events are relatively poorly understood. Threats and use of sanctions arise from 
innumerable contexts, but I have shown in this study that an empirical approach using 
references to sanctions in news media can shed light on some important characteristics of 
senders and targets that predict sanction events. The majority of these issues are related to 
aspects of economic power, trade relationships, and violent conflicts. 
The degrees of concentration and diversity of a country’s imports and exports are an 
important determinant of sanction threats and use. A higher value for the target’s target import 
diversity index predicts a higher likelihood of a sanction event. A country in the 10th percentile 
in the logged export diversity index is between 3.2 and 3.4 times more likely to be a target than 
a country in the 90th percentile, if all other variables are held at their mean values. The sender’s 
export concentration index is significant with a positive coefficient, meaning that sanctions are 
more likely when sending countries have a more specific group of goods that they trade. In one 
of the datasets used in this paper, a country in the 90th percentile of the export concentration 
index is 5.7 times more likely to threaten or initiate sanctions than a country in the 10th 
percentile. 
 Larger economies are substantially more likely to use sanctions. In one dataset used in this 
study, a country in the 90th percentile of total GDP is 58 times more likely to initiate sanctions 
than a country in the 10th percentile. As anticipated in the literature, poorer countries are more 
often targets, and very rarely initiate sanctions. Armed conflict in either the target or sending 
country is predictive as well, which indicates that sanctions are often used to support outside 
state interests during violent conflicts or to condemn actions by one or more party involved. 
This study also finds an ambiguous relationship between democratic dyads and the use of 
sanctions, and raises questions about the importance of unemployment rates in explaining 
sanction events in a cross-country setting. Although elsewhere in the literature it has been 
reported that democratic countries less commonly use sanctions against one another, I was 
unable to find a companion result in this context, indicating that the result may depend on the 
definition of sanctions being used, the period under investigation, and the covariates included 
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in the regression model. Likewise, it has been reported in the literature that sanctions are more 
likely in the US when unemployment rates are higher, although this does not appear to hold 
with respect to other countries and in different time periods. 
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3.8 Appendix A 
 
 
Afghanistan Germany Norway
Albania Ghana Oman
Algeria Greece Pakistan
Andorra Grenada Palau
Angola Guatemala Panama
Antigua & Barbuda Guinea Papua New Guinea
Argentina Guinea-Bissau Paraguay
Armenia Guyana Peru
Australia Haiti Philippines
Austria Honduras Poland
Azerbaijan Hong Kong Portugal
Bahamas Hungary Qatar
Bahrain Iceland Romania
Bangladesh India Russia
Barbados Indonesia Rwanda
Belarus Iran Samoa
Belgium Iraq San Marino
Belize Ireland Sao Tome and Principe
Benin Israel Saudi Arabia
Bhutan Italy Senegal
Bolivia Ivory Coast Seychelles
Bosnia and Herzegovina Jamaica Sierra Leone
Botswana Japan Singapore
Brazil Jordan Slovakia
Brunei Kazakhstan Slovenia
Bulgaria Kenya Solomon Islands
Burkina Faso Kiribati Somalia
Burundi Kuwait South Africa
Cambodia Kyrgyzstan South Korea
Cameroon Laos Spain
Canada Latvia Sri Lanka
Countries Included in Study
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Cape Verde Lebanon St. Kitts and Nevis
Central African Republic Lesotho St. Lucia
Chad Liberia St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Chile Libya Sudan
China Liechtenstein Suriname
Colombia Lithuania Swaziland
Comoros Luxembourg Sweden
Congo Macedonia Switzerland
Costa Rica Madagascar Syria
Croatia Malawi Taiwan
Cuba Malaysia Tajikistan
Cyprus Maldives Tanzania
Czech Republic Mali Thailand
Democratic Republic of the Congo Malta Togo
Denmark Marshall Islands Tonga
Djibouti Mauritania Trinidad and Tobago
Dominica Mauritius Tunisia
Dominican Republic Mexico Turkey
East Timor Moldova Turkmenistan
Ecuador Monaco Tuvalu
Egypt Mongolia Uganda
El Salvador Morocco Ukraine
Equatorial Guinea Mozambique United Arab Emirates
Eritrea Myanmar United Kingdom
Estonia Namibia United States of America
Ethiopia Nauru Uruguay
Federated States of Micronesia Nepal Uzbekistan
Fiji Netherlands Vanuatu
Finland New Zealand Venezuela
France Nicaragua Vietnam
Gabon Niger Yemen
Gambia Nigeria Yugoslavia
Georgia North Korea Zambia
Zimbabwe
Countries Included in Study (Cont.)
